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ForeWord
Since ambitious environmental targets have not been achieved, and a techno-
logy-driven efficiency revolution is missing to date, the 20th anniversary of 
the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in Rio de Janeiro in 
2012 aims to give new impetus to the debate on how to meet the tremendous 
global environmental and development challenges. Many global institutions and 
national governments, NGOs, major groups, and stakeholders have expressed 
their views regarding the green economy and green growth strategies. However, 
the discussion is less consistent and integrative than one would wish for. Strat-
egies for a comprehensive transition toward more sustainable production and 
consumption patterns remain largely unexplored, and the relationship between 
the green economy concept and the concept of sustainable development is still 
in need of clarification. Although it has been acknowledged that the old resource-
intensive, fossil fuel-based development model does not increase opportunities 
for development for the majority of people, the green economy concept and its 
consequences are distrusted in developing countries. The concern is that the 
green economy will cement the global economic structures and the increased 
use of efficient technologies may reinforce the dominance of the developed 
countries. From the perspective of many developing countries, the trade policies 
of industrialized countries, which further call for the opening of the markets, and 
their resource policy pushing for free access to raw materials, are raising fears 
that a green economy could ultimately do more harm than good.
This study – a collaboration of the Heinrich Böll Foundation; the Wuppertal 
Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy; and the University of Rostock – 
wants to contribute to the Rio+20 conference theme. It emphasizes the interac-
tions of green technologies that can accelerate the transition to a green economy, 
the resulting demand for more critical raw materials, and the interrelated socio-
political dimensions worldwide. A number of studies on the criticality of raw 
materials have been conducted in recent years and they almost all have one 
thing in common: the negligence of the socio-political dimension of criticality. 
For instance, the rare earth elements have attracted a great deal of attention due 
to China pursuing a restrictive export policy. However, attention is usually drawn 
to scarcities; supply shortages and barriers; price increases and volatility; high 
import-dependencies, as well as environmental problems caused by applica-
tion and use from the high-tech producing countries’ perspective. Less attention 
is given to questions concerning the mining and supply conditions; deficient 
equity and resource distribution; overconsumption in the North; and the factors 
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contributing to the fact that potential benefits are often not realized in resource-
rich and developing countries through selling raw materials.
While there has been a rise in the number of initiatives in the last years – 
for example, the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights, the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Natural Resource Charter, and others 
aiming at improving the governance of natural resources – Germany and the EU 
still have good reasons to accept their responsibilities for a serious upgrading of 
the principles for a fair and sustainable resource policy, which is needed if the 
existing resource market deficits and challenges of the future are to be met. The 
EU is the largest commodity importer of the world, and Germany is the major 
manufacturing hub within the EU, meaning that its industries and its agriculture 
are both importers and exporters of resources. Moreover, a stronger international 
outreach is deemed necessary. The study calls for institutional strategies, such as 
an International Resource Management Agency and a Multistakeholder Forum, 
as well as European and international phosphorus and metals policies and other 
approaches, in order to bring all these issues to light. It will hopefully challenge 
all those involved in the extraction, trade, and use of raw materials to think again 
about collective behaviors toward the often ignored implications of prevailing 
production, consumption, and trade patterns.
Wuppertal/Berlin, May 2012
Prof. Dr. Uwe Schneidewind Barbara Unmüßig
President of the Wuppertal Institute President of the 
for Climate, Environment and Energy Heinrich Böll Foundation
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l r
es
ou
rc
e 
Po
lit
ic
s
9
E
xe
cu
ti
ve
 s
um
m
ar
y
executIVe summary
Natural resources are back on the agenda. After the rise of new economic powers 
such as China, India, and Brazil, global competition has perceptibly increased 
strategic concerns as regards high commodity prices and possible supply short-
ages. Germany, the EU, the United States, and many others have formulated raw 
material strategies that put concern over access and supply at center stage. 
This paper underlines a new dimension of international relations and pleads 
for new approaches, called international resource politics. What is new – and 
will be stressed throughout the paper – is the interconnectivity across critical 
resource shortages, which presents two challenges:
  the environmental challenge to cope with impacts from using resources along 
their lifecycle;
  the socio-political challenge to cope with human rights, poverty, and freedom 
internationally.
These two dimensions are often neglected in strategic studies. However, this 
paper emphasizes their strategic character for the worldwide endeavor of a 
green economy and the forthcoming Rio+20 summit in Rio de Janeiro: Firstly, 
environmental benefits in industrialized countries may coincide with a shifting 
of problems to the poorer regions in the world. Biofuels are one recent example 
of such problem-shifting. Many of the key sectors in transition (for example 
energy, transport, agriculture) and innovative green technologies (solar, wind, 
electric cars, etc.) will continue to rely on the use of finite mineral resources that 
are often mined in countries with a weak governance structure and a poor record 
on human rights. Secondly, economic benefits of resource-efficiency measures 
in manufacturing sectors are dissatisfactory as long as the corresponding 
products end up as hazardous waste in poorer regions. Without an explicit inter-
national dimension, resource-efficiency strategies face an uphill battle against 
existing distortions and unfair competition. Thirdly, a finite planet with “plane-
tary boundaries” for key environmental parameters (some of which have already 
been transgressed) sets limits on substituting one finite resource (such as land) 
with another (such as fossil fuels) or vice versa. Business as usual is not an option 
– not for any actor nor for any country.
This paper attempts to raise awareness for an international resource politics, 
which can be used as a new element for ongoing debates concerning a green 
economy and transition strategies.
Chapter 2 explains the multidimensionality of critical resources and illus-
trates profiles of five minerals with relevance for a green economy: phosphorus 
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is an indispensable mineral for the agriculture sector and world food produc-
tion; coltan/tantalum is a so-called conflict mineral due to its illicit trade and 
the fueling of regional conflicts, especially in Africa; rare earths elements (REEs) 
show a strong reliance on one exporting country, China; platinum group metals 
(PGMs) (here platinum and palladium) are very difficult to substitute at present; 
copper is a mass material with great importance for green high-tech products but 
also indispensable for all energy infrastructures (see Table 1 in Section 2.6).
The key message is that criticality is a multidimensional concept that should 
also include the environmental dimension as well as human rights. Critical 
metals are increasingly relevant for green technologies; the mineral phosphorus 
is essential for food supply. However, risks and threats of the extraction of those 
resources are to be derived from a holistic concept that takes into account 
geopolitics, the governance of using this material, as well as climate change and 
other challenges.
Chapter 3 addresses potential goal conflicts and competing interests of a 
variety of actors – it is thought this will also stimulate debate about opportuni-
ties, synergies, trade-offs, and transformation strategies. Along the supply chain 
of resources, one sees a large variety of actors: mining companies and ministries, 
refineries, smelters and processors, manufacturing industry, green industry, 
NGOs, concerned citizens, end consumers. Resource management intercon-
nects the globe; understanding resource governance should follow a bottom-up 
approach of multilevel and polycentric governance, where the variety of actors 
and institutions on different levels is taken into account. A key is to acknowledge 
the global shifts from the OECD countries to new actors in the rest of the world. 
The complexity of global supply chains hinders transparency: While the main 
responsibility is upstream in the mining sector – where profits and innovations 
are often low – the main credibility is associated with industries downstream in 
the technology sector, where innovation is high and growth is created. Thus, the 
ability to act requires an enhanced cooperation with incentives along the supply 
chain of material flows.
Chapter 4 discusses the need for visions and proposes principles for a fair 
future of using natural resources. The need for visions follows basically from the 
current disorientation: Will prices continue to go up? Shall developed countries 
reduce their use of resources, even if geophysical scarcities are disputed? Given 
our proposals on the multicriticality of resources, and given the heterogeneity of 
actors and their interests, such visions and new principles shall provide orien-
tation, help to guide decision-making during uncertainties, and line up norma-
tive requirements such as human development and sustainability. The chapter 
starts with a short discussion of seven practical principles of sustainable resource 
management. It goes a step further and elaborates on freedom as a normative 
requirement toward elementary preconditions of freedom – the provision and 
maintenance of an adequate resource base, in particular for food and water supply, 
but also life-supporting functions of natural resources and ecosystem services. 
Poverty eradication thus goes hand-in-hand with a provision of adequate supply 
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of natural resources for the poor. Conversely, one can argue in favor of reducing 
resource consumption in the industrialized countries for the reasons of reducing 
environmental pressure and providing development space for the poor.
Chapter 5 takes a look at governance and market deficits as well as lessons 
learned from existing initiatives, instruments, and approaches. In the last years 
there have been a number of initiatives aiming at improving the governance of 
natural resources. While acknowledging such promising actions in general, this 
paper will focus on transparency, certification, and the ways in which initiatives 
and politics interact, surely without being able to give a full-scale evaluation. The 
strength of tools such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
the Dodd-Frank Act, and a number of others, is their tight focus on a narrow 
issue that has demanded action. However, the challenges will require stronger 
governance mechanisms and economic incentives to combat global overuse of 
resources, rebound effects, and problem-shifting and address the corresponding 
opportunities and responsibilities in industrialized countries. Thus, they will need 
a serious upgrading regarding the normative principles for a fair and sustainable 
international resource politics if all existing deficits and challenges of the future 
are to be met. In a broader sense, it seems that new hybrid forms of governance 
emerge, where formal regulations and stakeholder-driven initiatives co-evolve 
on the levels of industrialized countries, local groups in developing countries, 
NGOs, and business. Such hybrid forms of governance become more powerful if 
they leverage market access in the United States and the EU.
Chapter 6 proposes new response options for a number of stakeholders, 
business, NGOs, civil society, and governments alike. Germany and the EU have 
good reasons to accept their responsibilities in that regard. The EU is the largest 
commodity importer of the world (not China or the United States), and Germany 
is the major manufacturing hub within the EU, meaning that its industries and its 
agriculture are both importers and exporters of resources. Moreover and against 
all current odds, the EU is the largest internal consumer market of the world – 
with numerous leverage capacities for market access.
Leadership indeed will need to be demonstrated at home: Future commit-
ments of the EU and its member states toward resource savings, that is, an 
absolute decoupling of resource use (measured in total material requirements or 
any similar comprehensive indicator) from GDP should be central in any such 
strategy; similar commitments by major corporations (against sales rather than 
unit-based) should be encouraged. Putting one’s own house in order is a key 
ingredient for credibility and preparing market actors for long-term changes. 
An international resource politics could be launched with a strengthening 
of existing initiatives and move from knowledge to action via an international 
data hub, an international resource management agency, and a multistakeholder 
forum. Further activities should include policies on phosphorus, an international 
recovery of metals, and transformation of bilateral agreements toward sustain-
able resource management. The long-term perspective is a transition toward a 
sustainable world economy (see Table 3 in Chapter 7).
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1 Introduction
This paper underlines a new dimension of international relations and pleads for 
new approaches, called international resource politics. The authors wish to share 
their concerns about trends and their impacts as well as discuss a number of 
response options. Key activities addressed are the responsibility of industrialized 
countries, most notably and for illustrative reasons in the EU and Germany.
Following price increases for all commodities in the last 10 years, mineral 
resource scarcity has recently been analyzed in great detail. Experts and agencies 
widely agree that many materials are abundantly available – such as iron ore, 
sand, bauxite, etc. – while the situation for others is seen as being critical. Criti-
cality concepts stem partly from geology and partly from concerns about access 
and security. The recent German and European Raw Materials Strategies (BMWi 
2010; EC 2008) as well as a number of related reports (Mildner 2011a; PBL 2011; 
Kooroshy et al. 2010; etc.) document these findings. A common belief is that the 
growing demand from emerging economies could cause shortages of supply and 
that this needs to be addressed by means of international strategies to enforce 
free trade and create good investment conditions against rising resource nation-
alism. However, such strategies could result in a greater use of resources on a 
global scale without lowering the risks. Even the most resource-efficient technol-
ogies will continue to rely on finite resources and those using them will eventu-
ally be faced with the challenge of finding a political answer to the rebound 
effect (Madlener and Alcott 2011). In addition, there is a need to fundamentally 
question the growth-driven development paradigm and seriously discuss alter-
native prosperity models as well as consumption patterns (Jackson 2009). 
With the observation that the political will for global cooperation is rather 
weak in major countries, a spiral of more resource-related risks, dangers, and 
conflicts seems likely, as does the emergence of regional niches for the better 
management of individual resources. The challenges for any form of sustainable 
resource management on a global scale thus should not be underestimated. What 
is new – and what will be stressed throughout this paper – is the interconnectivity 
between critical resource shortages and two other challenges:
  The environmental challenge to cope with impacts from using resources along 
their lifecycle. According to the International Resource Panel (UNEP  2010), 
environmental impacts such as the greenhouse gas emissions generated 
from using mass metals and agricultural goods are as high as those generated 
from the use of fossil fuels, which causes global temperatures to rise. Other 
materials such as critical metals, which are used in much smaller quantities, 
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have recently been put on the research agenda. With other words: Climate 
change, land use, water shortages, and other critical ecosystems interconnect 
with the use of natural resources worldwide.
  The socio-political challenge to cope with human rights, poverty, and 
freedom internationally. While impacts of mining on human rights have 
been under scrutiny for quite some time, the larger context of livelihoods 
and equity has yet to be addressed: People fight for access to – and afford-
able prices for – water and food, whose shortages result, inter alia, from the 
overuse of resources and the subsequent environmental impacts. A recent 
survey involving researchers worldwide shows that they consider this topic 
a high priority (UNEP 2012). That is to say, global approaches addressing a 
fair distribution of natural resources and strategies to benefit the poor are at 
stake.
A further challenge is the increasing complexity of resource systems (see Figure 
1) and the hardly predictable interactions between environmental and social 
impacts. Obtaining increased quantities of minerals requires a subsequent 
increase in the amount of water and energy needed to generate them; critical 
thresholds may be surpassed at the local and regional levels and cause unpre-
dictable feedbacks at the national and international levels (Bündnis Entwicklung 
Hilft 2011).
The concepts of a green economy or a “green growth” strategy (e.g., UNEP 
2011a; OECD 2011a; EC 2011a; UNCTAD 2010) that are currently being put 
forward in the run-up to the Rio+20 conference provide valuable contributions 
toward addressing those challenges.1 Targets such as a drastic reduction of green-
house gas emissions, a switch to 100 percent renewable energies, Factor Ten 
improvements in resource efficiency, etc., provide orientation and guidance in a 
number of economic sectors. However, most of these concepts fail to address the 
question of how to create an economy that is not only green but also equitable, 
socially just, and that manages to overcome the governance deficits of our 
current “brown economy” (for example the influence of corporate lobbyists; the 
omnipresent protection of investors at the expense of the environment and the 
people; corruption, etc.). A green economy that rises to that challenge requires 
a fundamental transformation not only in all economic sectors but also in the 
underlying power relations between various actors (political, economic, social). 
When such strategies are pursued, moreover, there is a risk that their effects 
are selective: Firstly, environmental benefits in industrialized countries may 
coincide with the shifting of problems to the poor regions of the world. Biofuels 
are one example of such a shift. From a resource politics perspective, it is impor-
tant to realize – and take into account – that for many of these key sectors (for 
1 The UNEP definition is: “A green economy is one that results in improved human well-
being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological 
scarcities. In its simplest expression, a green economy can be thought of as one which is 
low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive” (UNEP 2011a).
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example energy, transport, agriculture) as well as for innovative green technolo-
gies (solar, wind, electric cars, etc.), pioneers will continue to rely on finite mineral 
resources (see Chapter 2). Secondly, the economic benefits of resource-efficiency 
measures in the manufacturing sector will continue to be unsatisfactory as long 
as the corresponding hazardous byproducts and waste end up in poor regions. 
The related risks of a “resource curse” in mineral-rich developing countries as 
a downside of a green economy in the North and poorly governed international 
trade should be assessed with care. Thirdly, a finite planet with “planetary bound-
aries” (some of which have already been transgressed) sets limits on substituting 
Figure 1: the resource nexus
Source: Transatlantic Academy 2012, inspired by PBL (2011)
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one finite resource (such as land) with another (such as fossil fuels) or vice versa 
(Rockström et al. 2009).2
Approaches to counteract negative consequences of prevailing resource 
consumption patterns – integrated lifecycle assessment, transparency, producer 
responsibility, etc. – certainly exist. Tools such as Strategic Environmental Impact 
Assessment and Material Flow Analysis, and initiatives such as the Model Mining 
Development Agreement (MMDA), the Resource Charta, and the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) have emerged over the last years and 
are supported by an encouraging number of actors. The Dodd-Frank Act in the 
United States and the proposed directives by the European Commission (EC 
2011b, 2011c) will give a push for responsible mining and supply chain manage-
ment. Yet, all these approaches seem largely fragmented, often even discon-
nected from one another, and they seem to lack a broader perspective as outlined 
above. Discussions about their strengths and possible limitations and a need for 
stronger mechanisms with a long-term perspective are certainly needed. 
For sure, business as usual is not an option – not for any actor nor for any 
country. Successfully meeting the needs of the world’s poor for more access to 
resources, avoiding destabilization of the economies both of the developing 
and the developed countries, reducing resource-related violence, and honoring 
democratic values require that all resources must be produced more wisely 
to increase the benefits that can be derived from them. At the same time, the 
impacts must be better managed in the mineral-producing regions and the 
benefits of which must be provided locally. These are enormous challenges. This 
paper attempts to raise awareness for an international resource politics, which 
can be used as a new element for ongoing debates concerning a green economy, 
transition strategies, and a revitalization of the commons (e.g., Bleischwitz et al. 
2009; French et al. 2009; Helfrich et al. 2009; Schepelmann et al. 2009; German 
Advisory Council on Global Change 2011). It will hopefully challenge all readers 
to think again about the strengths and weaknesses of good initiatives as well as to 
conceive a broader picture. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Chapter 2 explains the multidimen-
sionality of critical resources and illustrates five minerals with relevance for 
a green economy. Chapter 3 addresses potential goal conflicts and competing 
interests of a variety of actors – it is thought this will also stimulate debate about 
opportunities, synergies, trade-offs, and transformation strategies. Chapter 4 
discusses the need for visions and proposes principles for a fair future of using 
natural resources. Chapter 5 takes a look at governance and market deficits as 
well as lessons learned from existing initiatives, instruments, and approaches. 
Chapter 6 will propose new response options for a number of stakeholders, 
business, NGOs, civil society, and governments alike. Chapter 7 concludes the 
discussion and provides a brief outlook for the future. 
2 See, for example, http://www.sei-international.org/planetary-boundaries.
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2 critical resources in a green 
economy
challenges ahead
This chapter aims to draw attention to the dilemma that may arise from the 
increased application of critical resources in a green economy. The world is being 
subject to an unremitting trend of rising demand for resources (UNEP 2011b; see 
also Figure 2). As of 2010, the EU was the largest importer of resources world-
wide. Some hopeful signs in a few countries show that a relative decoupling of 
welfare from resource consumption may be possible; new initiatives promoting 
green economies emphasize the opportunities presented by a development path 
that does not require an increase in use of resources. But overconsumption in the 
countries in the northern hemisphere – above all as related to the areas of food, 
transport, and construction – make it difficult to achieve substantial progress.
Figure 2: global material extraction in billion tons, 1900–2005
Source: UNEP (2011b, 11), after Krausmann et al. (2009)
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Moreover, green economies and the related resource- and energy-efficient 
technologies increasingly rely on the utilization of rare, critical minerals due to 
their specific characteristics (Knoke and Binnewies 2011). Future sustainable 
technologies like electrical/electronic equipment and photovoltaic technolo-
gies (used for high-tech products to increase the quota of renewable energies in 
the energy sector) and battery technologies and catalysts (used in the transport 
sector for more sustainable transport modes) require specific materials (UNEP 
and UNU 2009; Angerer et al. 2009). Accordingly, extraction has risen sharply for 
certain minerals, with prices show an unprecedentedly high volatility, which is 
often perceived as an economic threat.
At the same time, the world food problem has not been solved, nor many 
interlinked problems concerning resources such as energy and water in connec-
tion with climate change. A number of advances were made in the past in devel-
oping an understanding of resource criticality (e.g., JRC 2011; Erdmann et al. 
2011; EC and DG Enterprise 2010; Lutz 2010; MacLean et al. 2010). These efforts 
have not been adequately reflected on the environmental and socio-economic 
dimensions. And, despite imminent scarcity, the mineral phosphorus is rarely 
mentioned in studies concerning critical resources (vbw 2011). The dominant 
definition and political interpretation of the criticality of minerals3 as being 
mainly a supply risk (EC 2008; BMWi 2011) is far too narrow. It does not take into 
account the following: the risk of escalating prices for food and water as a result 
of overusing other resources, with severe impacts on the poor; risks of a “resource 
curse” as a consequence of corruption, poor governance, and traditional 
conflicts; newly emerging risks when green industry requires critical materials; 
resource-related conflicts; prevailing incentives for illicit trade; and remaining or 
new precarious working conditions. It has to be emphasized though that green 
technologies and a rising demand for natural resources may offer new oppor-
tunities for developing countries to catch up and compete in the world market, 
when accompanied and supported by appropriate national and international 
policy approaches (UN DESA 2011).
This paper will therefore bring out a “multidimensional criticality” based 
on three dimensions of sustainable development and, as such, comprise an 
environmental, economic, and socio-political dimension (see Figure 3). Environ-
mental, economic, and social risks determine the degree of criticality of a metal 
or mineral. The understanding is that the use of critical minerals seems to be 
essential for sustainable development, but they risk causing serious threats to 
developing countries at the same time. Hence, many minerals can be considered 
critical regarding the criteria suggested by our paper (in particular for the poor). 
Going beyond critical minerals, our paper also stresses the need to manage all 
3 The EU considers 14 raw mineral materials as critical: antimony, beryllium, cobalt, fluor-
spar, gallium, germanium, graphite, indium, magnesium, niobium, PGMs (platinum group 
metals), rare earths, tantalum, and Tungsten – some of which are forecasted to triple in 
their demand by 2030. See also a new study by JRC (2011).
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resources more sustainably and argues for a reduction in global demand from 
the industrialized countries.
selected materials to illustrate the challenges ahead
In order to give illustrative insights and accentuate important aspects of the 
issue, the following materials have been selected from a list of potential critical 
minerals. Each material illustrates a specific main dimension of criticality but 
not all of them are going to be critical, in the sense of being currently scarce or 
facing a lack of supply in the near future.
  Phosphorus is an indispensable mineral for the agriculture sector and world 
food production.
  Coltan/tantalum is a so-called conflict mineral due to its illicit trade and the 
fueling of regional conflicts, especially in Africa.
  Rare earth elements (REEs) currently show a strong reliance on one exporting 
country.
  Platinum group metals (PGMs) (here platinum and palladium) are very diffi-
cult to substitute at present.
  Copper is a mass metal with great importance for green high-tech products 
but also indispensable for all energy infrastructures.
Figure 3: criticality of resources as a multidimensional concept
Source: Own compilation, inspired by PBL (2011)
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Differences between each of the materials and the related problems that reach 
into the supplier countries will become apparent. For all materials, the following 
interconnected dimensions are discussed:
The 1. environmental dimension is briefly sketched out through reference to 
the (known) major impacts or environmental pressures, the specific recycling 
situation, and options for substitution.4 In this context, the relevance for 
green technologies and the associated estimated future demand will be 
referred to.
Within the 2. economic dimension, critical minerals are characterized by the 
concentration of production in certain exporting countries, the import-
dependency of certain importing countries, and other factors such as 
material leakages due to open loops globally. Due to complex structures and 
material flows within the supply chains, snapshots aim to show important 
aspects and actors for the particular material.
The 3. socio-political dimension will be touched upon by exploring the human 
rights aspects and working conditions within the extraction countries, the 
imbalances within the relations between contracting countries, the regional 
conflicts, etc.
It is important to note that the scale of the industries connected with the minerals 
selected and the absolute and relative environmental impacts are dramatically 
different due to the differences in the quantities produced and the qualities of the 
materials.5 The differentiation has been made knowing that the three dimensions 
are interrelated and that the environmental and economic concerns have great 
impact on the human rights of the local people. The aim of this presentation, 
however, is to raise awareness about the complexity of the issue and – also by 
advancing to minerals – to provide background information that will contribute 
to the discussion of critical metals. 
2.1 Phosphorus – necessary to feed the world
Phosphorus is a core component of conventional mineral fertilizers and thus 
essential for industrialized agriculture – a key sector for a socio-ecological trans-
formation. As a plant nutrient, phosphorus is a non-renewable resource and 
sometimes described as the most critical tradable commodity (Wellmer and 
Becker-Platen 2008; Werland et al. 2010). 
Environmental dimension: The environmental relevance of phosphorus is 
very high; phosphorus mining, processing, and marketing are very resource- (e.g., 
water, energy) and emission-intensive (Ekardt 2011). In addition, phosphorus 
frequently occurs in combination with heavy metals, which may contaminate 
4 Worth noting: The International Resource Panel (UNEP 2010) has started to look at the 
priority materials from an environmental point of view, but has not yet comprehensively 
addressed the materials considered in our paper.
5 Notice by Luke Danielson, Jaako Kooroshy, and Imme Scholz.
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soils and compromise the entire food chain. The excessive use of phosphate ferti-
lizers reduces biodiversity and leads to soil acidification. Due to an extraordinary 
dissipative structure of application and through the wastewater, strong fertilizing 
also leads to excessive algae growth in lakes and seas worldwide (eutrophication), 
even to the emergence of “dead” zones in oceans (Wittmer et al. 2011).6
The material losses of the “mine to fork” global phosphorus path are 
extremely high: Only one-fifth of the mined mineral is finally consumed by 
humans (Schröder et al. 2010; see also Figure 4). Recycling is only in the experi-
mental phase while historical traditions of recycling, namely the application 
of animal manure and human excreta to agricultural soils, are relegated to the 
background (Jaakkola et al. 2011). A lifecycle-wide resource-efficient manage-
ment of phosphorus is indispensable for the future.
Economic dimension: The extraction and thus the environmental impacts 
through mining are concentrated mainly in China (37%), the United States (15%), 
and Morocco (15%), representing two-thirds of world production. The largest 
reserves are estimated to be in Morocco and Western Sahara (77%) while the EU 
relies exclusively on imports.
The special geological situation in North Africa is important. Huge phosphate 
deposits originate from a shallow sea at the turn from Cretaceous to Tertiary, 
which ranged from today’s Morocco to Egypt. Next to Morocco and the Western 
Sahara, Tunisia is also a remarkable phosphate producer. Both Morocco and 
Tunisia export phosphate mainly to India, but also to Pakistan, Brazil, and several 
other countries (Zepf 2009, 63f.)
About 90 percent of the global output of phosphorus is processed into ferti-
lizer. In addition, and to a lesser extent, it is used for the production of deter-
gents and cleaning agents, the production of cattle feed, and in various industrial 
areas (Cordell 2010). The worldwide consumption of phosphorus-containing 
fertilizers is estimated in the order of 45 million tons for 2015/2016 (IFA 2011; 
Werland et al. 2010) while the demand is predicted to increase 50 to 100 percent 
by 2050 (Jaakkola et al. 2011). Main importers will be South Asia, Latin America, 
and western Europe; the main contributors to an increase in world consump-
tion will be the rapidly growing economies of South Asia, East Asia, and Latin 
America (FAO 2008). Since phosphorus is non-substitutable in food/biological 
production, one can certainly speak of a “technology lock in” in current indus-
trial agriculture. Figure 4 shows a snapshot and indicates the difficulty in identi-
fying the key players within the supply chain of phosphorus while stressing the 
high material losses.
6 Rockström et al. (2009) estimate the “quantity of phosphorus flowing into the oceans” at 8.5 
to 9.5 million tons, while the proposed planet boundary is considered to be at 11 million 
tons.
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Socio-political dimension: The phosphorus peak is expected around 2035 
and, although estimations vary enormously, a full depletion of the resource is 
expected in 80 to 120 years (Schröder et al. 2010; Scholz 2011; Jaakkola et al. 
2011). Against this background, the authors emphasize that “(w)ith only a few 
countries controlling the world’s remaining high-quality reserves,” all importing 
countries are vulnerable to supply shortages and price volatility and other market 
forces. However, particularly affected by such shortages will be poor countries, 
where the feeding of the population is a problem and there are farmers who work 
with phosphorus-deficient soils – as is the case in much of sub-Saharan Africa 
(Schröder et al. 2010). It is a severe problem today that “many poor farmers do 
not have access to the phosphate fertilizer market (…), due to low purchasing 
power and access to credit, farmers in sub-Saharan Africa – where fertilizers are 
most needed – have to pay 2-6 times more than what European farmers [pay]” 
(World Resources Forum 2011a). A contributing problem is the global spread of 
diets containing increasingly more meat and dairy products, requiring even more 
phosphorus in the form of fertilizers for agriculture. Demand for non-food uses 
such as biofuels further increase global food problems (Schröder et al. 2010).
In the extracting countries, human aspects (e.g., Morocco) are touched 
whenever “the rights of workers to organize and to negotiate with employers 
are not respected in practice. Union representatives are harassed or dismissed 
as soon as they are elected. (…) The right to strike is constantly flouted“ (ITUC 
2011). Morocco has an ongoing conflict with Western Sahara over phosphorus 
Figure 4: supply chain snapshot – phosphorus
Source: Own compilation
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reserves. The Human Development Index (HDI) rank of the country is 114 and 
the Failed State Index (FSI) has issued a warning. 
2.2 coltan/tantalum – a conflict mineral 
The name coltan is derived from the old name of columbite (now niobite) and 
tantalum, and almost exclusively refers to the niobium-tantalum mixed ore 
found in the Congo. Tantalum is a rare transition metal also found in several 
other countries. Due to its temperature stability, corrosion- and acid resistance, 
and thermal and electric conductivity, coltan/tantalum is an important material 
for high-tech and green technologies.
Environmental dimension: Coltan/tantalum is found in riverbeds, sediments, 
and soft rocks, and the extraction does not require great technical effort. In 
Central Africa, widely artisanal and small-scale production has emerged, causing 
land erosion and water pollution. Due to illegal hunting of “bush meat” by 
miners, a serious threat is posed to the gorilla population in Central and West 
Africa. Coltan/tantalum is characterized by a strong dissipative and dispersed 
usage due to very small quantities used, which strongly limits its ability to be 
recycled. Australian tantalum is contaminated with uranium.
Economic dimension: Coltan/tantalum is needed for applications such as 
miniaturized ICT applications (computer, measuring and control electronics, 
communication technologies), for example tantalum micro capacitors (mobile 
phones, pager, laptops, navigation systems, consumer electronics), which 
comprise about 40 percent of current world production, and special steels 
resistant against extreme conditions that are used for turbines for power genera-
tion and aircraft construction (Figure 5).
Tantalum minerals are mined in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, China, Ethiopia, and Mozambique and as a by-product of tin 
mining and smelting in Thailand and Malaysia. Coltan from Central Africa was 
only a minor source of tantalum until 2008, but figures vary largely. According 
to Huy et al. (2011) in 2008, around 1,400 tons of tantalum were mined; in 2009, 
between 800 and 900 tons were mined. There were 200 to 250 tons that came 
from the areas of the Great Lakes in East Africa. From 1995 to 2008 African 
countries provided 12 to 34 percent of the annual production of tantalum. After 
the withdrawal of Australian and Canadian producers in 2009, more than 50 
percent of the tantalum supply came from Africa (Huy et al. 2011).7 There is a 
strong concentration of coltan/tantalum reserves in Brazil (ca. 68%) and Australia 
(ca. 30%); Central Africa is usually not included in the data. The metal shows no 
7 The extent of illegal mining and illicit trade is not transparent but investigated by Bleis-
chwitz et al. (2012). On December 14, 2010, the EITI Board designated The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo as an EITI candidate country that is “close to compliant.” The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo was granted six months (until June 12, 2011) to complete 
the remedial actions needed to achieve compliance. The Board retains the right to require 
a new validation if the remedial actions are not completed within the next six months.
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acute shortages; despite low reserves, a long period of availability is foreseen. The 
material is partly substitutable, but this is difficult in the field of microelectronics 
due to the very low quantities applied.
Socio-political dimension: Some recent studies estimate that one-fifth of the 
world market of coltan is illicitly traded (Bleischwitz et al. 2012), mostly to capac-
itor producers in China. Coltan is a so-called conflict mineral8 because it is, inter 
alia, being mined in the DRC, where the revenues are assumed to have been 
used in and for armed conflicts (Nest 2011). A definition of the term “conflict 
mineral” is provided in the U.S. Declaration of Conflict Minerals (the so-called 
Dodd Frank Act) and encompasses the materials tantalum and columbite-tanta-
lite (coltan), tin/cassiterite, tungsten/wolframite, gold, and their derivates. In 
addition, it specifically refers to materials “determined by the Secretary of State 
to be financing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining 
country”9 and stipulates that products shall be DRC conflict-free. An alternative 
definition of a “conflict resource” is provided by Global Witness: “natural resources 
whose systematic exploitation and trade in a context of conflict contribute to, 
benefit from, or result in the commission of serious violations of human rights, 
8 See for an overview of legislation: http://www.ipc.org/ContentPage.aspx?pageid=Conflict-
Minerals#legislation
9 Section 1502 (the ‘‘Conflict Minerals Provision’’) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act.
Figure 5: supply chain snapshot – tantalum/coltan
Source: Own compilation with data of Resolve (2010)
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violations of international humanitarian law or violations amounting to crimes 
under international law” (Global Witness 2006).
In addition, the working conditions in the artisanal and small-scale mining 
operations in DRC are considered inhuman (ITUC 2011). In connection with the 
conflicts, the situation of women is supposed to be one of the worst in the world. 
The HDI ranks DRC at 168 (of 169). It is estimated that four to five million people 
have died as a direct or indirect result of the two wars in the Congo since 1998.10 
The Second Congo War is sometimes called the “coltan war” because much of 
the conflict has focused on gaining control of the abundant natural resources 
of Congo. The FSI 2010 alerts that the situation is “critical” for DRC, and issues 
a warning for the neighboring country Rwanda, which is considered to be a 
preferred trade route.
2.3 rare earth elements – a scabrous monopoly
Due to their use in the high-tech sector, particularly for environmental technolo-
gies, rare earth elements (REEs) are considered to be of great strategic impor-
tance.11 Different than the name might suggest, not all of the 17 individual 
elements of the REE group are actually that rare. While lanthanum, cerium, 
and neodymium are the most abundant of the REEs, lutetium is the rarest, yet 
still more abundant than gold or platinum. However, the concentration of the 
elements in mineable minerals is usually very low, so that only a few deposits are 
worth mining. The term “rare” originates from the early discovery of the mineral 
when it was initially classified strange and rare.
Environmental dimension: Environmental impacts from mining, produc-
tion, and use are non-transparent and partly controversial. During the extrac-
tion processes, chemicals are needed – these are generally hazardous, meaning 
that millions of tons of toxic substances are accumulated in the meantime. 
Another problem are specific emissions which are being released during the 
mining processes. Uranium and thorium sometimes occur in conjunction 
with neodymium; during further processing, not only toxic but also radioac-
tive substances have to be handled. These may be released and get into the 
surrounding water and the air, which can create dangerous environments 
(Öko-Institut 2011; Murphy & Spitz Research 2011). The development of 
secondary raw material cycles, the recycling of REEs, is necessary but compli-
cated because REEs are typically used in very small quantities in a variety of 
different applications (dispersed usage).
Economic dimension: REEs are especially needed for automotive catalysts or 
fluorescent lamps and they are increasingly important in high-strength perma-
nent magnets, computer hard disk drives, hybrid cars, and wind turbines (here 
10 Information by Luke Danielson.
11 Fifteen elements within the chemical group consist of lanthanides plus yttrium and 
scandium and are called rare earth elements.
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particularly neodymium) (Du and Graedel 2011; see also Figure 6), flat screen 
and touch screen technologies, and partly strong concentrations in military 
technologies. The concentration of production is extremely high, but very large 
reserves over a very long range (more than 200 years) are estimated. China is by 
far the largest producer (97%) of REEs, despite deposits of only ca. 48 percent 
of the reserves (Öko-Institut 2011). Large deposits of REEs are assumed to exist 
in the Pacific seabed and in Greenland. There is no production in the EU, thus 
Europe is 100 percent reliant on imports. Twenty-five years ago, the United States 
was the largest producers of REEs – the Mountain Pass Mine (owned by Molycorp 
Inc.) was closed but it is expected to open again in 2012.
The global demand for REEs is projected to double in 2014 (JRC 2011). 
Although new mining sites and suppliers are expected to enter the market, 
demand may become critical in the short term (3-5 years). Due to their environ-
mental impacts and the hazardous waste produced, new sites are often highly 
controversial, such as a planned REE refinery in Malaysia.12 
Socio-political dimension: The current non-substitutability of some REEs and the 
monopoly position of China in extraction, and partly further processing, make 
12 See, for example, the Malaysians protest against rare earth refinery; http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2012/feb/26/malaysians-protest-rare-earth-refinery; notice of Stacy VanDe-
veer.
Figure 6: supply chain snapshot – rare earth elements
Source: Own compilation with data from Öko-Institut (2011)
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the supply situation politically delicate on the international scale (Adelphi and 
Wuppertal Institute 2010). After China restricted its exports of certain materials 
(bauxite, zinc, coke, magnesium, and phosphorus), some countries success-
fully complained to the WTO (Mildner 2011a), which improves the chances of a 
successful lawsuit of the EU, the United States, and Japan against Chinese export 
restrictions of REEs. This, however, only reflects the political and economic inter-
ests of the importing countries and does not refer to social mining standards.
According to the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) World 
Survey 2011 “labor activists in China are regularly harassed and groups shut 
down“ (ITUC 2011), but it is not known whether these findings apply to the 
extraction of REEs. It seems beyond discussion though that the environmental 
standards for mining in China are comparably low and REEs have a tendency 
to be illicitly traded (Hurst 2010a). “What is ironic about the rare earth dilemma 
is that China needs to cut back its production and regain control of its industry 
so that it can figure out how to decrease the environmental damage caused by 
the industry. Meanwhile, the rest of the world needs these REEs to help clean up 
the environment through the innovative application of green technologies. (…) 
It appears impossible for the country to meet the global demand for REEs, while 
also meeting its own domestic environmental and safety needs” (Hurst 2010b). 
There is no transparency concerning financial transfers. China is not a member 
of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
2.4 Platinum group metals – no substitution for green-tech at present
Platinum group metals (PGMs)13 have important physical and chemical proper-
ties, such as a high corrosion-resistance and non-toxicity, and that is why they 
are increasingly applied in green and high-tech solutions in the transport and 
medical areas. Platinum metals are expensive and rare.
Environmental dimension: PGMs tend to occur together in the same mineral 
deposits. The mining and smelting of PGM ores is very resource-intensive. 
Large amounts of mining waste are accumulated; it consumes large quantities 
of energy and water, and carries extremely heavy “ecological rucksacks” (Saurat 
2008, 2009). For the production of a single ounce of platinum, a volume of 7 to 12 
tons of ore have to be processed (UNCTAD 2007).
The structures of the secondary loops within the processes are very different. 
The production of industry catalysts and glass operate in almost closed loops, and 
therefore rely mainly on secondary inputs, whereas electronics and car catalysts 
use mainly primary resources (Saurat 2008, 2009). For the global recycling of 
platinum metals, only catalysts of end-of-life vehicles are available as scrap; thus 
the recycling rate is low (Lucas and Wilts 2011; Angerer et al. 2009; see also Figure 
7).
13 The platinum group metals (PGMs) refer to six metallic elements: ruthenium, rhodium, 
palladium, osmium, iridium, and platinum.
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The projected future demand is estimated to increase up to a factor of 1.5 
by 2030. Considerable impacts on palladium demand may arise due to the need 
for seawater hydrogenation technologies (Angerer et al. 2009). The largest share 
of the present demand for platinum is for jewelry, which is relevant for three 
reasons: First, jewelry is rarely discarded or recycled (Wilburn and Bleiwas 2004); 
second, a use-conflict could arise; and, third, the term “critical” must be used with 
caution, as long as large parts of the world supply are used for luxury goods. 
Economic dimension: For green technologies, PGMs are applied in vehicle 
emission control devices and electronics as well as industrial catalysts such 
as hydrogenation, air cleaning, seawater desalination, etc. A critical need may 
arise for platinum with the widespread use of fuel cells for electric vehicles. The 
production by volumes is, compared to other materials, rather low and the range 
is considered to be very long (more than 200 years) (Wittmer et al. 2011). An acute 
shortage is no danger at present.
Figure 7: supply chain snapshot – platinum14
Source: Own compilation, with data from UNCTAD (2007)
South Africa contributes 75 percent and Russia 13 percent of platinum produc-
tion, while South Africa is estimated to deposit 95 percent of the reserves. There 
are not more than 10 significant platinum mining companies in the world – large 
14 Main operators in the mining sector in South Africa are Anglo American plc, Aquarium 
platinum plc, Arcelor Mittal, Areva, Barrick Gold, BHP Billiton, CAMEC, Codelco, Debeers, 
Holcim, Imerys, Incitec pivot limited, JNMC, Lafarge, Ionmin, Mineral Commodities Ltd, 
Rio Tinto, Trivalence Mining Corp, Vale, and Xstrata.
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corporations with a high degree of vertical concentration. As it is a precious 
metal as well as an industrial metal, the enterprises often have different divisions 
dealing with the refining, processing, and trading as well as research divisions 
for new applications and investment activities (e.g., Umicore) (UNCTAD 2007). 
Substituting PGMs is currently very difficult as the resulting products usually do 
not show the expected properties.
Socio-political dimension: Europe relies 100 percent on imports; the supply 
chain is characterized by high material losses, in particular in its use for cars 
that are not recycled within Europe but exported to other territories without 
recycling structures. The transparency of financial flows is difficult to monitor 
due to material leakages and unreliable players (Hagelüken 2011). According 
to the ITUC World Survey 2011, human aspects come into play in South Africa 
when workers’ rights are neglected and difficult to implement (ITUC 2011). As 
regards the HDI, South Africa ranks 110. The FSI issues a warning for the country 
in 2010 as well as for Russia. Neither country is an EITI member, so the financial 
transfers related to PGMs are not fully transparent. Another important producer 
is Zimbabwe, where platinum is one of the most important export products. As 
the mines are isolated, there is no information about the situations at the mining 
sites.
2.5 copper – indispensable for infrastructure worldwide
Copper has been used by human beings for more than 10,000 years and it is one 
of the key metals of industrialization. Due to its excellent thermal and electricity 
conductivity, its corrosion-resistance, and flexibility, it has many end-uses (Ayres 
et al. 2002).
Environmental dimension: Copper is considered to be among the top 10 
environmentally-intensive materials (Voet et al. 2005). The average ore grades 
have been declining in recent years to less than 1 percent, partly due to exhausting 
copper deposits, but also due to the introduction of new technologies allowing 
for economical extraction of copper with significantly lower grades.15 As a result, 
the associated volumes and the environmentally problematic issue of disposal 
are increasing significantly (Erdmann et al. 2004). The largest producer, Chile, 
uses groundwater for extraction and is increasingly faced with water stress.
Apart from copper-based paints and its use for algaecides for swimming 
pools, copper is predominantly not used in a dissipative manner and is therefore 
almost fully recyclable. That is why one does not speak of consumption – as in 
the case of fossil energy resources – but of use. The recycling rate, for example, 
is 55 percent in Germany and 13 percent worldwide (RWI et al. 2006). Although 
there is no geological shortage of copper, recycling of copper has always been 
15 Declining ore grades are no issue for smelters though. On the contrary, the commodities 
markets may appreciate prices at a steadily high level (Hotter 2011). 
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done for economic reasons. It is estimated that 90 percent of human-produced 
copper is still in use today.
Economic dimension: Refined copper and copper products are used in many 
applications, mainly for electrical cables (48%), electrical equipment (8%), 
construction and buildings (27%), engineering (12%), transport (3%), and other 
industrial applications (2%) (ECI 2011. Copper is the most important material for 
the conduction of electricity due to rarer and more expensive alternatives such 
as gold, silver, and aluminum. It is therefore very important for all electric and 
electronic future technologies such as wind energy plants, geothermal energy, 
and fuel cells, and it is an essential component of solar thermal systems made of 
copper. It is also directly linked to a better life for the world’s poor, as electrifica-
tion is critical, for example, for the rural (and urban) poor of Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America.
Due to the growth in China and other emerging countries, demand for 
copper has increased dramatically, from 13.6 million to 16.1 million tons, or by 
18 percent worldwide between 2001 and 2010 (ICSG 2011), with the main drivers 
being infrastructure development and electrification. The main copper-im-
porting countries and regions are the EU27, China, the United States, Japan, and 
South Korea, which partly re-export it as refined or semi-finished products (ECI 
2011; see also Figure 8). The projected demand for 2030 created by new green 
technologies and the growing need for infrastructure development in emerging 
countries is expected to grow by a factor of 2.6 (Angerer et al. 2009). Copper 
shows huge production quantities that are mainly concentrated in Chile (ca. 34% 
of world production), Peru (ca. 8%), and the United States (ca. 7%).
Copper scrap is traded on international markets (Lucas and Bleischwitz 
2008). Due to the price volatility of copper, aluminum has gained interest as an 
electrical conductor in electrical systems. In addition, aluminum offers a high 
potential to reduce weight, but it shows generally poorer mechanical properties 
and requires new connection technologies and connector concepts (Lucas and 
Bleischwitz 2008). In ICT-related technologies, copper may also be substituted 
by glass fiber.
Socio-political dimension: The supply vulnerability of copper is low for 
industrialized countries due to very large reserves, which are also estimated to 
be mainly concentrated in Chile (24% in 2010), where, however, working condi-
tions and contracts remain precarious in some copper mines (ITUC 2011). The 
growing copper industry in Sambia has led to increasing migration to the cities 
and the development of shanty towns (World Resources Forum 2011b).
Copper projects strongly influence the surrounding communities, due to 
conflicts over water and land use (Bebbington 2007; Scurrah 2008; Danielson et 
al. 2010). In particular, (ground)water and energy use for mining processes cause 
shortages for the communities, for example in Chile and Peru (Chile Sustentable 
2010; SDSG 2010). The mining of copper provides a typical example of how local 
communities suffer from environmental and social costs resulting from resource 
exploitation (e.g., Grasberg in West Papua or the mining and refining site at Oroya 
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in Peru) (Scurrah 2008). Auty (2006) emphasizes that mine construction creates 
a large and relatively well-paid workforce that generates transient local business 
opportunities; but this workforce bids up the price of local labor, housing, and 
food. In the Peruvian Andes, for instance, mining creates islands of welfare 
among poor indigenous communities.
There is an imperative for more long-term analyses of the risks of new 
coppers projects with regard to social and environmental conflicts with local 
communities and the serious impacts on the social situations of the communi-
ties around the mining sites (e.g., Pebble Mine, Alaska, Tampakan Project, Philip-
pines, Minera Panama, Panama, Oyu Tolgoi, Mongolia).
2.6 assessment of factors within the multicriticality concept
In order to summarize the facts provided above, the following table assesses the 
critical factors within the environmental, economic, and socio-political dimen-
sions through the categories of very critical (red), alert (yellow), and currently 
non-critical (green). It has become obvious that industries in these markets often 
are shrouded in secrecy, and transparency is very low. Accordingly, losses and 
material leakages are high. The global equity dimension becomes most apparent 
with the use of phosphorus, which is indispensable for feeding the world. It is 
treated in a very inefficient manner and without any prioritization toward basic 
preconditions of freedom and development. 
Figure 8: supply chain snapshot – copper
Source: Own compilation with data from Five Winds International and ICMM (2010)
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table 1: assessment of critical factors within the multi-criticality concept
                             resources
critical factors
Phosphorus coltan ree Pgm copper
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l d
im
en
si
on
Depletion of reserves large 
demand for 
jewelry
Concentration of extraction 
and environmental pres-
sures
Recyclability
Use-conflicts often by-
product
Water
Overuse of ecosystems
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
im
en
si
on
Import-dependency
Lifecycle wide material 
losses
Concentration of end-use 
production (value gains)
Substitutability
Weak institutional setting 
in export country / Resour-
ce curse threat
(Africa)
S
oc
io
-p
ol
it
ic
al
 d
im
en
si
on
Human rights violations / 
Child labor
Precarious and dangerous 
working conditions
Illicit trade primary 
materials
secondary 
materials
secondary 
materials
Imbalances of power
Failing states involved in 
supply chain
(Potential) resource con-
flicts
Note: Red: critical; yellow: should be observed; green: not critical. It has to be noted that the classification is based 
on experts’ estimates. A similar coloring based on weightings can be found in vbw (2011).
Source: Own compilation
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Despite a lack of transparency, the snapshots of the supply chains and the assess-
ment of the five materials regarding their criticality give first hints of the relevant 
actors needed for further action. Green high-tech products are usually not differ-
entiated according to whether the required materials are “green”, in the way that 
the specific environmental and social conditions and impacts in the extracting 
and processing countries are respected and considered. The following chapter 
will focus on the different interests and intervention levels.
Key message: Criticality is a multidimensional concept that should also 
include the environmental dimension as well as human rights. Critical 
minerals are increasingly relevant for green technologies; phosphorus is 
essential for food supply. However, risks and threats of the extraction of 
those resources are to be derived from a holistic concept that takes into 
account geopolitics, the governance of using this material, as well as climate 
change and other challenges.
Open issues and diverging views: Critical minerals are usually used in 
relatively small units, while – ostensibly inconsistent – the global demand 
for all natural resources requires comprehensive approaches. While it is 
clear that fossil fuels, base metals, and agricultural goods are relevant, it 
is less clear to what extent construction minerals and individual resources 
should be targeted. Methodologies such as Material Flow Analysis and Life 
Cycle Analysis have different strengths and weaknesses; the governance 
dimension is an emerging key topic.
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3 a landscape of actors and 
interests for critical resources
There has been a change in the market for resources in the last 20 years. The 
major mining companies consolidated and broadened their influence, while at 
the same time the mining industry came under more public scrutiny, with local 
communities and NGOs challenging current extraction patterns. Countries like 
China, India, and Brazil, with their often state-owned enterprises, became major 
players, both as supplying and importing countries. The conditions under which 
the minerals are produced, however, are virtually the same as before. Until now, 
there has been no socio-ecological transformation as far as mining conditions are 
concerned. And it would be difficult to single out a specific part of the resource 
economy as being green. Enterprises in the green economy depend on the same 
structures within the minerals sector as the conventional economy. The examples 
presented in the previous chapter demonstrate that enterprises providing green 
technologies need the same mainstream minerals (like copper) and that they are 
integrated in the same trade structures. They are confronted with the monopo-
lies created by countries or companies producing minerals and also have to deal 
with artisanal mining and the associated trade structures, which are difficult to 
control. The upswing for eco-industries in the North may have a dark side for 
the South, namely the resource-rich countries being moved onto paths of rapid 
extraction that exceed the limits of the ecosystems and socio-economic insti-
tutions of those regions and fuel civil wars with resource rents (Bringezu and 
Bleischwitz 2011).
3.1 brief stakeholder analysis and action levels
The actors respond to different interests and their relationship amongst each 
other is characterized by an imbalance of power. Some of the underlying 
problems result from the existing goal conflicts and competing interests of key 
actors. Only by understanding them will we be able to identify the most promising 
approaches to address the problems in the resource supply chain. This chapter is 
not meant to give an exhaustive analysis of the actors, but rather to spotlight the 
key actors and main interests.
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3.1.1 National level
High-tech and green-tech producing countries: Their interests can be assumed to 
lie in stable resource supply, good prices, and free access to resources (EC 2008; 
BMWi 2010). Countries like those in the EU – including Germany – the United 
States, and Japan, as well as the emerging economies are looking mainly for 
national solutions that promote transparency in addition to looking for bilat-
eral agreements with resource-rich countries (Knoke and Binnewies 2011); the 
EU and Japan are developing strategies to promote resource efficiency. Inter-
nationally, they are trying to secure access by removing trade barriers, while 
emerging economies like China are trying to protect their vulnerable industrial 
processes through state intervention and trade barriers. At the same time, some 
governments, as with the German government, are refusing to become directly 
involved in the resource supply by building national stockpiles of strategic or 
other minerals and metals. But they are encouraging their industries to “verti-
cally reintegrate,” or to invest directly into extraction projects. 
In the past, German industry seemed to perceive limited accessibility to 
resources as a greater threat than price instability, and enterprises were quite 
cautious to invest directly into extraction. Recently, new raw material alliances 
that the Federation of German Industry established with 12 major German enter-
prises aim to improve and consolidate the supply through direct investments in 
resource projects. They lobbied for years (e.g., the German industry association 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) to get more direct support from the 
governments for securing their resource supply (Bäuerle et al. 2011). There are 
companies that have started looking into recycling as a means of securing their 
supply, but that has not become a major trend yet. 
Resource-rich developing countries: The economy of many resource-rich 
countries is dependent on resource extraction and export. This makes these 
economies vulnerable to price volatility and to shifting demands in high-tech 
and green-tech producing countries (the substitution of minerals or develop-
ment of new technologies, e.g. lithium). These countries can be assumed to 
be trying to profit from the recent high prices by bringing their deposits into 
production (e.g., Peru). In most cases in Africa or Central Asia, the countries 
themselves do not control their mineral production. In Ghana, Mali, Sambia, and 
Mongolia, the mining sector is 100 percent under the control of foreign compa-
nies (Bäuerle et al. 2011). Former national state-owned mining companies (as in 
Sambia) have been dismantled, national private companies have not been estab-
lished, and foreign investors have entered the national market. In other resource-
rich countries such as Indonesia, Kazakhstan, South Africa, or Mexico, national 
private and public companies account for 20 to 80 percent of mineral production. 
Although in theory countries without any national companies or investments in 
the mineral industry could safeguard their interests via good long-term contracts 
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with the extractive industry, in practice this is seldom the case.16 While African 
countries are trying to attract foreign investment, some Latin countries like 
Bolivia and Ecuador are attempting to rebuild their national mining industries. 
They are interested as well in establishing their own processing and manufac-
turing industries, bringing into question the traditional international division of 
labor. New mining countries are often interested in rapid and high payments in 
order to invest in infrastructure and social systems.
3.1.2 Sectoral level
Mining Industry: The mining industry is dominated by 150 enterprises worldwide 
that control about 80 percent of worldwide mineral production (Ericsson 2009). 
Vertically integrated transnational mining companies like BHP Billiton, Anglo 
American, Vale, Rio Tinto, and Freeport McMoRan dominate the sector. During 
the last 10 years, the mining industry witnessed a period of major mergers in 
the sector, consolidating the hegemony of those companies. But Vale, Rio Tinto, 
and BHP Billiton not only control a high share of iron production but almost 70 
percent of the maritime trade, which enables them to increase the iron price 
as well as to alter the contracts (e.g., reduce the contract terms to only three 
months). Mining companies of emerging economies are on the rise.
Other important developments are: 
  Former trading companies like Glencore and Xstrata, which merged this year, 
are rapidly increasing their share of worldwide mining production;
  Chinese mining companies are trying to invest directly into production 
sites worldwide or to increase their share in existing companies (e.g., when BHP 
announced its intent of the takeover of Rio Tinto, Chinalco increased its share in 
Rio Tinto by 12%);
  Some of the critical minerals (e.g., coltan) are mined by artisanal mining, 
giving more economic and social importance to that sector (Hruschka and 
Echavarria 2011).
Manufacturing industry: The manufacturing has traditionally focused on securing 
supply – most managers have a deep-rooted belief in declining resource prices. 
The previous years have begun to erode such a paradigm, with more emphasis 
being put on resource productivity and savings in material costs. This indeed has 
put more of a focus on mass materials, energy, and water, and less of one on 
critical materials. The overall trend is not yet certain and can be assumed to be 
dependent on many other trends and policies. With mixed information on new 
discoveries such as shale gas as well as on business opportunities for resource 
efficiency, it is very hard to predict in what direction industry will move. The 
16 That might be illustrated by the anecdote Peter Eigen, the former chairman of EITI, gave: 
When Mozambique negotiated several mining concessions, the state secretary of that 
country was confronted with 20 international jurists on the payroll of the mining company. 
This gives insight into the imbalance of power in those kind of negotiations.
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emergence of some three billion middle-class consumers in the years to come 
will lead to increased manufacturing and the subsequent demand for resources 
(McKinsey 2011). As for today, major investments in radically new systems using 
eco-innovation on an international scale can hardly be expected.
Green high-tech industry and suppliers: Green-tech manufacturing industries 
have an interest in the smooth supply of the materials they need at reasonable 
prices. As a business field, green technologies have not yet taken over responsi-
bilities for upstream mining or production methods. As long as material certi-
fications and material responsibility are not standard requirements for green 
products/technologies, complex value chains and international trade relations 
will continue to pose barriers to transparency with regard to the origins of specific 
minerals and the backgrounds of their extraction for end-consumers. Yet, these 
industries can be assumed to be in favor of better governance, be it for reasons 
of reputation or stable supply or simply because it belongs to their corporate 
principles.
Recycling industry: The recycling industry seems to be technologically capable 
of recycling critical materials to a high quality and recovering phosphorus from 
wastewater streams (Buchert et al. 2012). Yet, their market development is uncer-
tain, given the high amount of material leakages and international distortions 
(Hagelüken and Meskers 2010). Potentially, they might integrate horizontally 
with refineries and capacitor producers that contain huge technological capaci-
ties for the production of essential material inputs and could be seen as major 
customers for secondary materials (UNEP 2011c).
Non-governmental organizations and civil society: Civil society and the NGOs 
have an essential and indispensable role to play for citizens/consumers, states, 
markets, and policy for awareness-raising and ethical reflections of macro-
economic decisions and processes. 17 
Consumers: The emergence of three billion middle class consumers world-
wide will put increased pressure on the resource base. Yet it is unclear whether 
they all will emulate Western lifestyles. The enormous levels of environmental 
pollution in emerging economies may lead to increased awareness for the 
material intensity and carbon footprints of goods and services, and information 
is key to putting pressure on companies and governments.
3.1.3 Local and regional levels
Artisanal and small-scale mining: There is a big difference between industrial 
and artisanal mining. Not only do they have conflicting interests concerning the 
access to deposits (for example, in Peru or Venezuela), but artisanal mining also 
comprises a completely different structure. Artisanal mining provides employ-
ment for about 25 million people worldwide – mainly to those who do not have 
any other alternatives – and feeds at least 150 to 170 million people (Hruschka 
17 See, for example, the British campaign: http://www.ethicalconsumer.org.
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and Echavarria 2011). The work is highly precarious and carries high environ-
mental and health risks. 
Local communities and indigenous people in resource-exporting countries: 
This points to a very complex issue because the communities living on the land 
used for mineral extraction do not need the resources for their livelihoods. The 
interest in extracting the minerals is fueled by those who need technologies 
for a structural economic change in other countries. Resource-use conflicts 
arise because land, soil, forests, and water are essential resources for survival 
(Neumann and Schöppner 2011; Feldt and Ströbele-Gregor 2011); the export-
driven extraction model and internationally operating mining companies often 
make self-determined management impossible.18
Current resource extraction models make it impossible for communities to 
manage their resources on a sustainable basis. Private as well as state-owned 
enterprises have proven incapable of managing the extraction activities in a 
way that improves living conditions for the majority of the local people (there 
are many examples from Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Guatemala, Philippines, 
Indonesia, Sambia, etc.). First signs of a vague trend from coercion toward 
consent can be noticed, since brutal human rights abuses can be made public 
much faster using the Internet (Danielson 2011). Nevertheless, there seems to 
be a need for new management models that enable local people to participate 
in decision-making and be able to develop their own resource strategies, such 
as Community Development Agreements (Padilla et al. 2008) or Impact Benefit 
Agreements.
3.2 competing interests 
Mapping potential conflicts and drawing potential scenarios for international 
relations is a huge task with enormous uncertainties; the European Commis-
sion’s Joint Research Center (JRC) recently published an online tool19 that will 
help to conduct such an analysis. All such scenarios should also keep in mind 
that cooperation will also be an option (Mildner 2011a). The following section 
thus seeks to help provide a better understanding of the main lines of potential 
conflicts rather than drawing conclusions about main trends.
3.2.1 Access to resources for strong states vs. loss of sovereignty in weak states
There is a clash of interests between industrialized and emerging economies 
over access to resources, which is aggravated by impacts on weak developing 
countries. This competition might shift power relations, worsen the relations 
between resource-poor states, and spill over into other countries, as the Stock-
18 Notice of Luke Danielson and Imme Scholz.
19 Global Atlas & Information Centre for Conflicts and Natural Resources: http://nareco.jrc.
ec.europa.eu/
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holm International Peace Research Institute fears: “The interstate tensions 
explored in the resource geopolitics literature have not, at least to date, involved 
armed conflict. Instead, political and commercial disputes are seen as worsening 
relations between states, with potential security ramifications. However, compe-
tition between powerful geopolitical actors around resource issues can spill over 
into third countries, thereby contributing to instability and the emergence of 
weak states, making them more vulnerable to the rise of armed groups” (SIPRI 
2011: 42). Almost unnoticed, the security of resource supply became part of the 
military strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and their 
members. “Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, 
climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the 
future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the poten-
tial to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.”20 This is mirrored by 
similar statements in Russia, China, India, and others.
3.2.2 Reducing commodity imports vs. export-financed development
Some industrialized countries are beginning to strive to reduce their resource 
use while resource-dependent countries want to sell their minerals at the best 
price possible. However, many developing countries have not profited from 
exporting resources in recent decades (Collier and Venables 2011). Demands for 
compensation where a resource is being substituted or displaced have been put 
forward by resource-dependent countries. There is no international mechanism 
beyond the markets that could balance the different interests (Barma et al. 2012). 
The International Resource Panel could provide knowledge but has no political 
mandate and is by and large too weak. It can also be argued that most extractive 
companies have failed to extend their scope toward a broader resource manage-
ment, including recycling, etc. 
3.2.3 Recovery of material losses vs. international open systems with low 
environmental standards
The EU – including Germany – the United States, Japan, and others in the last 
decades have not put enough emphasis and research/resources into recycling, 
efficiency, and substitution to reduce primary input-dependency. They have 
failed to implement sustainable production and consumption patterns. Instead, 
electronic goods that quickly become waste (incl. hazardous and industrial 
waste) are exported to countries where there are no recycling infrastructures or 
capacities to tackle the problem sufficiently. About 70 percent of all discarded 
computers, mobile phones, and other electronic equipment are ultimately 
20 NATO, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and 
Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,” Lisbon, Nov. 19, 2010, 
available at: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.
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recycled in China (Greenpeace 2009). The situation is quite similar as regards 
end-of-life vehicles, whereby many countries have an interest in the re-use and 
exploitation of old cars (Wilts et al. 2011).
It should be noted that the lines of conflict can be found between and within 
individual countries and between and within stakeholder groups for one reason 
or another. As expressed above, not all conflict lines must result in genuine 
conflicts; they may raise opportunities for common action or cooperation and 
should be considered as risks or potentials.
3.2.4 Responsible actors
The recent debate on mechanisms and solutions to the governance problems 
in the resource sector globally has focused almost entirely on voluntary and 
multistakeholder initiatives, including due diligence and certification. The 
most prominent one, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which is 
mainly attempting to improve information transparency, is far from being able 
to solve the problem of corruption and bribery in the extractive sector (Feldt 
and Müller 2011). Activities of intergovernmental organizations, such as special-
ized United Nations agencies, have attempted to provide a level playing field for 
poorer countries, for example through commodity agreements, which basically 
have failed. The only commodity agreement on metals ever negotiated was on 
tin, but it never became relevant because – among other things – it lacked the 
support of important producers like Brazil and China. After some major devel-
opments in the follow-up to the Johannesburg Conference in 2002, such as the 
founding of the International Council on Mining and Metals, the publication of 
the Mining Minerals and Sustainable Development Report (IIED 2002a, b, c) and 
the introduction of the World Bank Extractive Industries reviews (see, e.g., World 
Bank Group 2011), the importance of mining-related topics has declined again. 
Mining is not part of the Rio+20 agenda for 2012. 
It is therefore all the more important to focus attention on the different 
clusters of actors and their specific constellation of interests (IIED 2002a).
  Mining companies – often operating on an international scale and are not 
resident in the country where they conduct mining business (multinationals, 
partly including smelting and refining); coltan is mainly extracted through 
small-scale and artisanal mining .
  Smelters and refiners – are often small-scale or small and medium-sized 
enterprises, Sometimes on site or in the mining country (e.g., PGM, REE, 
phosphorus from the United States, coltan) or the refining processes take 
place in another country (e.g., phosphate rock from Morocco, fertilizer 
production worldwide); however, copper mining companies are vertically 
integrated with their own smelters (e.g., CODELCO, Rio Tinto, BHP, Freeport, 
etc.)
  Industrial suppliers of key components and processes to green-tech industry: 
for example, capacitor industries, manufacturing of magnets, manufacturing 
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of catalysts, computer components, etc. They are also indispensable for a 
material flow management because they are active in the input, byproduct, 
and recycling areas.
  Material-intensive, large enterprises using critical resources that are sensitive 
to customer and consumer behavior: electronic goods, automobile, agricul-
ture, etc.
  Suppliers of green technologies that should be sensitive to consumer aware-
ness, for example wind energy; alternative agricultural methods; photo-
voltaic, fuel cell, and battery technologies, etc.
  Suppliers of recycling and waste management technologies, for example mono-
incineration plants for phosphorus recovery, waste separation technologies, 
etc. 
  Final consumers are in charge of their purchase decisions and their consump-
tion patterns when using products containing mineral commodities. 
  Developing-country governments, including good and bad practice examples 
in the way resource rents are distributed for development; countries are 
becoming more sophisticated in advocating their interests. 
  Communities and indigenous people affected by environmental impacts 
and resettlement through mining and processing; this group of actors can 
be found in all countries involved in the supply chain and at all production 
stages.
Since those actors sketched above have different time horizons and interests 
concerning the issue, it is most important to give priority to awareness-raising 
in supply chain issues. Given that, for example, key actors such as smelters and 
refineries often have a very high material-flow competence, but little influence on 
the demand and downstream use, the end-product industry and the consumers 
in Europe must not be forgotten within an international resource approach. 
Responsibility thus should entail the whole lifecycle of materials, including 
the end-of-life stage of products, infrastructure planning, and land use manage-
ment. In that regard, pioneering activities from suppliers of green technologies 
could create a momentum with recyclers, smelters, and refiners and other key 
suppliers, actively promoted by groups of consumers who compel larger parts of 
the manufacturing industry to innovate. 
The following additional actors have to be taken into account for regulatory 
instruments, policies, and alliances (see Table 5 in the annex for an overview):
  NGOs/civil society in the field of mining, recycling, material-flow manage-
ment
  Leadership of communities affected by development in minerals industry
  Indigenous peoples in the field of mining
  NGOs/civil society in the area of transparency and good governance
  Governments of resource-dependent industrialized countries (Germany, 
Japan, European member states, and also emerging markets like India and 
China)
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  Governments of resource-rich countries that would benefit from cooperation. 
This is currently weak due to countries like China that offer attractive invest-
ment policies; that is, the strengthening of democracy in those countries is 
also a prerequisite for cooperation with the EU.
  International institutions and organizations, such as ILO, UNEP, UNDP, FAO, 
World Bank, etc.
  Further stakeholders such as associations of industries, multistakeholder 
initiatives, global networks, etc.
Key message: The diversity and number of actors involved in the critical-
resource supply chains are enormous and, by nature, interests diverge. 
Global shifts from the OECD countries to new actors in the rest of the world 
can be observed. The complexity of global supply chains hinders transpar-
ency: While main responsibilities are upstream in the mining sector, where 
profits and innovations are often low, the main credibility is associated with 
industries downstream in the technology sector, where innovation is high 
and growth is created. 
Open issues and diverging views: The heterogeneity of actors, combined 
with a lack of information and uncertainty about future trends, may 
counterbalance rational interests in favor of resource savings. Views about 
industries’ strategic interests differ: while some argue in favor of a “resource 
revolution” (McKinsey), others point at examples of ongoing irresponsible 
behavior, such as mining in sensitive ecosystems and questionable new 
technologies. 
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4 normative principles for fair 
and sustainable international 
resource politics
While international relations hardly appear to favor enhanced cooperation 
and multilateralism lately, many governments are preparing for harsher times 
of increasing resource-related conflicts in the years ahead: The discovery of 
minerals in Afghanistan worth $1 trillion creates a race of interested firms and 
supporting governments to get permissions, with likely repercussions in Afghani-
stan itself and with neighbors such as Pakistan. The Indo-Pacific region witnesses 
a naval arms race to enforce access to offshore fishing and resources. Norway and 
other Arctic powers invest in coast guards and air systems just in case the race for 
Arctic minerals gets serious. Huge dam projects under way in China, Ethiopia, 
and Sudan ring alarm bells in downstream river countries. These are but a few 
headlines that indicate a possible future world where the law of the jungle and a 
“live and let die” mentality prevail.
It is high time to take action. Along with it, developing visions, principles, 
and scenarios toward new models of prosperity should be on the agenda. They 
should be characterized by a reduction in resource demand, social innova-
tions in resource-use patterns, a greater decision-making role of affected local 
communities, and a culture of responsibility and cooperation. An international 
resource politics needs visions and new principles. Given our proposals on the 
multicriticality of resources and given the heterogeneity of actors and their inter-
ests, such visions and new principles shall provide orientation, help to guide 
decision-making under uncertainty, and line up normative requirements such 
as human development and sustainability. Today, the behavioral and institu-
tional mindsets are often biased toward issues such as providing access to “our” 
resources and providing cheap resources as a fuel for economic growth, etc. To 
enable behavioral change and fresh institutional mindsets, new normative orien-
tations are necessary to develop politics that lead to goals and instruments as 
well as to evaluate the effectiveness of those orientations. It is also relevant for 
hybrid governance processes that deal with conflicting interests because claims 
of acting in favor of common interests are in need of such normative criteria. 
Developing such visions and new principles certainly will require a participa-
tory process that utilizes stakeholder consultations and new means of communi-
cation such as using mobile apps (see Anna Hazare’s Anti-Corruption Movement 
in India), human microphones (such as the ones used in the Occupy Wall Street 
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movement), living laboratories, etc. However, there should be a departure from 
the prevailing narrow focus on access and supply. What is needed is the insight 
to work on a comprehensive, lifecycle view of resources and their use in socie-
ties today as well as for future generations.21 Figure 9 illustrates today’s use of 
resources with environmental impacts across the lifecycle.
Especially the metals considered in our analysis are usually demanded because 
of their characteristics and their ability to deliver certain qualities; these aspects 
can be maintained, or even improved, during their lifecycles. Usually, citizens 
expect certain services and not the resource per se. Moreover, a comprehensive 
view will also challenge the paradigm of resources being perceived as private 
commodities isolated from their environments, and stress the collective-goods 
dimension of resources and the environment. 
21 On the following legal and ethical dimensions, see in detail Ekardt (2011: para. 4, 5).
Figure 9: resources and the environment
Source: EEA (2011)
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Box 1 maps what can be seen as the dawn of a coming age of responsible 
sustainable resource management with the resulting political initiatives.
box 1: Principles and visions of sustainable resource management
1. Secure, adequate supply and efficient use of materials, energy, and 
land resources as a reliable biophysical basis for creation of wealth 
and well-being in societies and for future generations.
Resource-efficient and 
recycling-based industry
2. Maintain life-supporting functions and services of ecosystems.
3. Provide for the basic institutions of societies and their co-existence 
with nature while maintaining the resilience of local communities 
and economic sustainability of resource extraction in producer 
countries. Steady-stocks society
 4. Minimize risks for security and economic turmoil due to 
dependence on resources. 
Respect for Human Rights of peoples living in mining areas. 
Benefits from extraction should accrue fairly to both current and 
future generations.
5. Contribute to a globally fair distribution of resource use and 
adequate burden-sharing at the international, national, and local 
levels. Solarized Technosphere
Balanced bio-economy and 
beyond 
6. Minimize problem-shifting between environmental media, types of 
resources, economic sectors, regions and generations.
7. Radical scaling-up of resource productivity (total material 
productivity), at least at a rate higher than GDP growth, and go 
beyond GDP.
Source: Adapted from Bringezu and Bleischwitz (2009, 155ff) 
For the perspective of our paper – a perspective that addresses both ethics and 
constitutions (in international, European, and national law matters) – the resource 
topic offers quite different perceptions on human rights: On the one hand, the 
well-protected freedom rights of consumers and companies; on the other hand, 
proclaimed rights to the elementary preconditions of freedom such as food, water, 
climate stability, security, energy access, a basic supply of essential resources, an 
absence of wars and civil wars, etc. To understand these conflicting perceptions 
in more detail, it is necessary to give a (both ethical and legal) reinterpretation of 
the basic term “human rights,” which is freedom. As with any (re-)interpretation, 
it is not just a vision, but something normatively binding. The starting point is 
the idea of liberties, as in classical-liberal guarantees of self-development. But 
one should also consider some extensions that are highly relevant for interna-
tional resource politics:
  Freedom also has an intergenerational and global dimension, since at their 
point in life, the young and future generations of people are, of course, 
human beings and are therefore protected by human rights – today this 
applies to people in other countries. And the right to equal freedom must be 
directed precisely in that direction where it is threatened – in a technological, 
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globalized world, freedom is increasingly being challenged across genera-
tions and across national borders. Local decisions can have far-reaching 
impacts on distant persons. Purchasing a mobile phone, for instance, may 
have impacts on local miners in Central Africa. Therefore, it should become 
clear that fundamental rights also apply intergenerationally and globally, 
that is, in favor of the likely victims of the current handling and overuse of 
resources such as critical minerals, food, water, etc.
  The classical-liberal understanding of freedom, which mainly focuses on the 
economic freedom of those alive now, leads to short-sighted time horizons for 
decision-making. It is important to interpret freedom rights unambiguously 
in such a way as to include the abovementioned elementary preconditions 
of freedom – the provision and maintenance of an adequate resource base, 
in particular for food and water supply, but also life-supporting functions 
of natural resources and ecosystem services.22 For without such a subsist-
ence level and without life and health, there is no freedom. By and large, 
the recent discussion on human security leads in a similar direction toward 
the preconditions for human development.23 This fundamental right to the 
elementary conditions of freedom is explicitly provided to the extent that life 
and health are concerned (see Article 2, paragraph 2 of the German Consti-
tution; Articles 2 and 3 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; Articles 2 
and 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights; Principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration).24 This leads to important implications for future international 
resource politics:
– To ensure a proper food supply (which is also based on phosphorus) on a 
worldwide and intergenerational scale; 
– To acknowledge the principle of materials stewardship of all actors that 
deal with natural resources management and a lifecycle perspective of 
natural resources – this is especially relevant for metals; 
– To take responsibility for maintaining life-supporting functions and 
services of ecosystems; 
– To adopt policies of resource-savings in fairness to the poor and to future 
generations.
  Our understanding of “Protection of freedom where it is endangered” implies 
a right to protection (by public policy) against fellow citizens (and not only 
22 In liberal democracies, there are also “further” (in contrast to “elementary”) precondi-
tions of freedom such as macroeconomic stabilization, or protecting biodiversity, etc. 
Such “further” preconditions of freedom are usually seen not as human rights per se but as 
obligations of the public policies (without corresponding rights of individuals). This does 
not mean at all that these “further” conditions are less important.
23 Here one may refer to the UNDP report on Human Security (UNDP 1994) or the recent 
discussions about environmental security, see for example Brauch et al. (2011).
24 One could argue that the German Constitution, Article 2, paragraph 1, has a counterpart in 
Article 6 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a general EU right to freedom (using 
an interpretation in accordance with its wording). The same is true for Article 5 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights and other similarly structured bills of rights.
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in exceptional circumstances). For autonomy is not only threatened directly 
by the state, but also by private actors, whose actions are “only” approved or 
tolerated by the state. This implies a protection, for example, against destruc-
tion of life-supporting ecosystem services or basic social institutions or resil-
ience of local provisioning systems, which threatens freedom and its condi-
tions, such as overuse of resources, by any public power against such fellow 
citizens, including companies. 
  Protection rights in the environmental context are not excluded, despite the 
fact that, for instance, many resource problems concern only forthcoming 
hazards of fundamental rights. That means that human rights are not only 
relevant for definite encroachments, but also provide a foundation for the 
precautionary principle.25
The trade-off between the “environmental” and “social” aspects of human rights 
and the classical liberal guarantees of freedom for consumers and enterprises 
offers some leeway and requires a balancing procedure. Nevertheless, especially 
with regard to the overuse of resources in most industrialized countries, some 
binding principles can be derived:
  The polluter pays principle can be derived from the principle of freedom 
itself. For freedom must include responsibility for the foreseeable (including 
environmental or social) consequences of one’s own actions – even in other 
countries and in the future, and also for the unpleasant consequences of one’s 
own life plan. The negative consequences of an action that would otherwise 
benefit me (for instance, of cheap free resources today) must always fall back 
on me, if only by way of cost recovery for the damage created by that action. 
This implies:
– To minimize problem-shifting of different types: between environmental 
media, types of resources, economic sectors, regions, and generations;
– To establish responsibility and accountability in international commodity 
markets;
– To operationalize criticality of minerals as outlined above.
  Remaining uncertainties do not preclude action in favor of those freedom 
rights: Just as uncertainties about the magnitude of climate change are no 
excuse to refrain from action for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the 
need to recover phosphorus and critical metals is obvious.
  The task of politics is to address and balance the trade-offs between one’s 
own and another’s freedom and, in addition, to provide institutions and 
25 Undoubtedly, future trends are not per se predictable and therefore “uncertain.” However, 
such an objection would fail, because impairments of fundamental rights, which are “only 
possible” are not irrelevant with respect to fundamental rights, especially under the threat 
of irreversibility of the “possible” infringement. Otherwise, fundamental rights would no 
longer serve the very purpose of legal fundamental rights: to guarantee the protection of 
autonomy exactly where autonomy is threatened with impairment.
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incentives that realize external freedom preconditions. However, this does 
not mean that the political and democratic process has to provide an equal 
distribution in the sense that certain material goods (like resources) would 
necessarily have to be equally distributed. Rather, with respect to elemen-
tary preconditions of freedom, equal treatment – as with liberties themselves 
(that is, unlike for “further” freedom-promoting conditions) – is necessary 
to ensure that everyone is able to receive essential services and goods derived 
from ecosystems and the natural resource base (Hayward 2006). This is 
supported by four arguments:
– Without a right to an equal absolute minimum level of elementary freedom 
preconditions, freedom would be of no value for the poor – and liberal 
constitutions respecting human rights guarantee equal liberties. This 
“equal subsistence” means specifically two things: Everyone must have a 
minimum level of resources, energy, etc., available – however, all must be 
(because this is also basic) protected from disastrous encroachments such 
as climate change. A normative implication is that resource exploitation 
and damages caused by Western lifestyles must be reduced absolutely. With 
regard to food provision, industrial countries shall recover phosphorus 
to facilitate that every person (worldwide and also in the future) can 
enjoy affordable food supported through the use of a certain minimum 
of phosphorus – and many people thus far worldwide do not come close 
to reaching their “equal” per capita share. To fight energy poverty, critical 
materials should be prioritized toward supporting clean energy for the 
poor. These illustrations remind us to be cautious about translating 
inequalities, with regard to resources, into too detailed resource-related 
targets.
– Since the collective good character of life-supporting and non-substitut-
able resources like phosphorus become obvious, it seems plausible to turn 
usage rights – or the “proceeds” of an unequal distribution (e.g., use of the 
atmosphere) – into equal parts for all persons as far as possible, for no one 
can claim for themselves that they have accomplished a special “perform-
ance” to produce that good. This second argument can also be seen as an 
argument e contrario of the polluter pays principle (which also follows 
from the principle of freedom). This leads to a theoretical justification of a 
principle of common heritage of mankind applied to geological and anthro-
pogenic stocks. The latter is also of relevance for critical materials that can 
and shall be recovered from products and infrastructures. Furthermore, 
this can also mean a participation of local people in rents derived from 
resource exploitation.
– Sometimes a minimum use of natural resources can hardly be defined per 
se – but freedom of mankind in general may be endangered by overuse of 
resources. Therefore, international resource politics should contribute to a 
globally fair distribution of resource use and an adequate burden-sharing.
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– A “fair” distribution of resources could seek to minimize risks for security 
and economic turmoil due to dependence on resources.
Discussion: The transition toward renewable energies and energy 
efficiency may require more demand for copper than in business-
as-usual scenarios. Shall copper nevertheless be governed toward an 
absolute reduction? Even if this has a trade-off against low-carbon 
technologies? Even if environmental and social effects of copper 
mining and production can be drastically reduced? Shall human 
beings have a “right for copper” that is distributed equally across the 
globe and generations, despite the fact that they need functions and 
services rather than the material itself?
  On a preliminary basis, a higher access rate to resources for developing 
countries could be justifiable for their fight against poverty.
  Another important consequence of the principles justified above is: Colliding 
human rights and interests described in Chapter 3 call for distinct rules for 
public authorities – not only with regard to those countries where freedom 
and democracy are at stake. Purely voluntary solutions will probably not be 
enough.
  On a procedural basis, colliding human rights imply a broad participation of 
all stakeholders in all legislative and administrative decisions with relevance 
to resources.
The implications of all this might be a process to formulate visions with targets 
along the following lines: 
  Absolute reduction of material use in industrialized countries; that is, 
absolute decoupling of resource use from GDP for OECD countries.
  Relative decoupling for developing countries, including newly industrializing 
countries; partnerships and cooperation between these and OECD countries, 
especially with resource-rich countries; provision of adequate supply of 
natural resources for the poor.
  Emerging economies will aim for absolute decoupling after per capita 
threshold benchmarks comparable to resource-efficient industrialized 
countries are within reach.
  Radical up-scaling of resource productivity (total material productivity), at 
least at a rate higher than GDP growth.
Key message: Those who say technology and markets will fix it are wrong: 
The main challenge of addressing the multicriticality, as expressed in 
Chapter 2, is about normative orientation of international governance 
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processes. Freedom, in our understanding, should include the necessary 
preconditions for human development and a provision of adequate supply 
of natural resources for the poor.
Open issues and diverging views: Principles such as preconditions of 
freedom and the collective goods dimension of resources require further 
thoughts as well as specifications. The UN Framework on Business and 
Human Rights (protect, respect, access to remedy) is not yet specific with 
regard to extractive industries and resources. One more specific issue: How 
should the allocation of critical materials be organized toward priorities of 
poverty reduction?
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5 Prevailing governance and 
resource-market failures
In the last years there have been a number of initiatives aimed at improving the 
governance of natural resources. While acknowledging such promising initia-
tives in general, our paper focuses on transparency, certification, and the ways 
initiatives and politics interact. Our argument is that these initiatives will need a 
serious upgrading toward the principles mentioned above if all existing deficits 
(see Table 2) and challenges of the future are to be met. Bringing these issues 
to the front will hopefully challenge all those involved in these initiatives to 
think again about collective behaviors toward the often ignored implications 
of prevailing consumption patterns. At the same time, it should also be clear 
that the connotation of many resource-related security discussions is by far too 
narrow to capture the impacts and response options on the ground.
On transparency in resource markets and politics, the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a good example of (a) a new initiative gaining 
ground in a number of countries, and (b) how voluntary and binding regula-
tions might interlink. Constant lobbying by NGOs such as Publish What You Pay, 
Revenue Watch, and others, as well as the adoption of OECD due diligence guide-
lines (OECD 2010, 2011b), led to a section in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (2010)26 in the United States, which obliges extrac-
tive companies listed on the US stock exchange to report their payments on a 
country-by-country and project-by-project basis. The EU Commission27 released 
its communication on annual financial statements October 2011, proposing a 
mandatory country-by-country and project-by-project disclosure from extrac-
tive industries and loggers of primary forests. There are four interesting aspects 
to observe: 
The country-by-country and project-by-project reporting would not have 1. 
been included in the Dodd-Frank Act without EITI and the lobbying power 
of the Publish What You Pay coalition, even though EITI transparency is 
high on the international resource agenda. In the case that the Dodd-Frank 
regulation starts to deliver information, NGOs in resource-rich developing 
26 Section 1504 (the ‘‘Disclosure of payments by resource extraction issuers’’) of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). 
27 European Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related 
reports of certain types of undertaking, COM (2011) 684/2.
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countries will be able to use the information – thanks to national EITI multi-
stakeholder platforms.
The extractive industry uses EITI as an argument against the Dodd-Frank Act, 2. 
arguing that binding regulation would undermine the (voluntary) efforts in 
the context of EITI. Despite such lobbying efforts, however, one can observe 
changes globally in the industries toward compliance, encouraging political 
shifts, for example, in the DRC’s mining sector.
EITI itself seems to be unable to broaden its scope to address the wider 3. 
agenda of bribery and corruption in the extractive sector.
The Dodd-Frank Act (Art. 1502) requires companies to disclose whether they 4. 
are sourcing conflict minerals from the DRC or neighboring countries in the 
Great Lakes Region. However, implementation is still pending. Certification 
schemes are under development, and the EU might develop its own approach 
to due diligence and certification schemes. 
To counteract the risks of a “resource curse,” the Natural Resource Charter 
(including Paul Collier and Karin Lissakers) has developed 12 precepts of good 
governance in resource-rich developing countries. It offers rich and experience-
based knowledge for practitioners in those countries. Being endorsed by, for 
example, the African Development Bank, the African Union, politicians, and 
some countries, it seeks to establish a process of mutual support and exchange 
in the future. However, this will remain a science-driven, voluntary initiative 
and therefore will lack binding enforcement mechanisms – similar to guidelines 
and studies released by the International Council on Mining and Metals – unless 
legally binding mechanisms are introduced. It also seems to be focused almost 
entirely on necessary reforms at the national level and may fall short of dealing 
with concerns of the local communities that have too often been abandoned by 
their own governments (e.g., Niger Delta, West Papua).
Another useful tool is the Model Mining Development Agreement for Sustaina-
bility (MMDA), where the Mining Law Committee of the International Bar Associ-
ation, with administrative support from the Sustainable Development Strategies 
Group, has assembled a 200-page model contract that covers all stages of mining 
project development in a country. As it is web-based and publicly available, it 
provides an agenda for negotiations and stakeholder consultations, with special 
emphasis given to the needs of local groups. This tool is especially useful for new 
mining countries (Central Asia, Central Africa), where the capacities in public 
administrations and local NGOs are weak compared to well-equipped mining 
corporations.
Further ahead in the lifecycle of using resources, efforts to increase resource 
efficiency have been gaining ground lately. The European Commission has 
launched a flagship initiative on a resource-efficient Europe, supported by many 
efforts at the level of member states and regions. Japan, China, and other Asian 
countries have related strategies about the 3Rs (reduction, reuse, recycling).
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Other relevant initiatives are, for example, the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Their 
common denominator is a multistakeholder participation including industry, 
governments, and NGOs (from the South and the North). These initiatives and 
a number of others at the regional level are briefly summarized in an annex to 
this paper. They address a number of deficits in resource markets that have been 
identified by research (Table 2), especially illicit trade and risks of a “resource 
curse.” In line with our paper, however, more needs to be done to address the 
environmental dimensions and human rights.
box 2: the un Framework on business and Human rights
business and human rights
The issue of business and human rights has been part of the global policy agenda since the 1990s. It 
became necessary as the economic activities of transnational companies rose dramatically while the 
capacity of many governments to control those companies diminished. The Special Representative of 
the UN Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and business, John Ruggie, explained in his 
report to the Human Rights Council the reason why this issue is a topic for the UN: “The root cause 
of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the governance gaps created by globali-
zation - between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to 
manage their adverse consequences. These governance gaps provide the permissive environment for 
wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation. How to narrow 
and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human rights is our fundamental challenge.” (Human 
Rights Council, A/HRC/8/5, 2008, 3) 
The extractive industry has been high on that agenda. According to a survey by John Ruggie, of 
65 violations reported by NGOs, the extractive sector dominates this sample with two-thirds of the 
total. The extractive industries also accounted “for most allegations of the worst abuses, up to and 
including complicity in crimes against humanity, typically for acts committed by public and private 
security forces protecting company assets and property; large-scale corruption; violations of labor 
rights; and a broad array of abuses in relation to local communities, especially indigenous people.” 
(UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97, 2006, 25) 
As an answer to the question about what the UN, states, and business enterprises should do to narrow 
the aforementioned gap, he proposed a framework that is based on three pillars “Protect, Respect, 
and Remedy,” grounded in:
 – The duty of states to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms;
– The corporate responsibility to comply with all applicable laws and to respect human rights;
– The need for greater access by victims to effective remedies, judicial as well as non- judicial. 
The framework and the Guiding Principles for its implementation demand “that business enterpri-
ses should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse 
impacts.” (A/HRC/17/31, 6) 
The Human Rights Council endorsed the framework (2006) and the Guiding Principles for the 
implementation (2011). John Ruggie himself described the Framework and Guiding Principles 
as an end of the beginning because there are still gaps to fill. At the moment, the Guiding Prin-
ciples are implemented partly on the level of pilot projects. There is still a need for an internati-
onal framework to make them “normal practice.”
In light of the previous chapters, this is good news. In particular, the transpar-
ency and certification efforts will tackle the main deficits of markets for critical 
resources (see next table). Despite all potential shortcomings, the existing conflict 
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mineral provisions, along with the OECD due diligence guidelines, set a very 
important precedent in the development of standards for companies operating 
in and sourcing from any conflict area. If such systems were to be implemented 
on a larger scale, positive effects on governmental revenues, price volatility, and 
property rights in general could be expected that would also benefit the poor 
in those regions. For that reason, a strong emphasis should be given to full 
implementation of these initiatives with a further push toward empowerment 
and enforcement. Furthermore, emerging economies such as China, Russia, 
and Brazil should get involved – and the EU and the United States should fully 
acknowledge these principles with regard to their domestic extraction activities. 
Following Haufler (2010) and her analysis of the Kimberley certification 
process, the elements of establishing inclusive and relatively strong institutions 
can be seen as key elements for success. 
In a broader sense, it seems that new hybrid forms of governance emerge 
(Avant et al. 2010), where formal regulations and stakeholder-driven initiatives 
co-evolve on the levels of industrialized countries, local groups in developing 
countries, NGOs, and business. These new governance processes are beginning 
to overlap on agendas such as ethical concerns, corruption, and conflicts. They 
involve a number of stakeholders or “governors”28 with some power in bargaining 
and shaming, thus going beyond the more traditional voluntary agreements 
that almost exclusively establish secret gentlemen clubs between industry and 
governments. Hybrid governance coalitions with NGOs and empowerment of 
civil society in developing countries may therefore trigger the development of 
better institutions and a legal framework in those countries, in the EU and the 
United States, and internationally.
As for the status quo, however, a critical discussion should address four main 
potential shortcomings:
Implementation, dissemination, and enforcement of environmental, social, 1. 
and human rights standards remain uncertain.
If a focus on a limited number of minerals remained that only addressed 2. 
the specific situation of the DRC (such as the Dodd-Frank Act in the United 
States), it could lead to potentially negative impacts in that country and others 
because (a) illicit trade may shift to other natural resources and activities; (b) 
companies may decide to purchase their commodities from other countries, 
thus lowering the income in those poor regions; and (c) any relocation may 
shift environmental burdens to other regions. 
The substantive standards for transparency and certification need to be 3. 
enlarged over time to fully address bribery and corruption in the extractive 
sector and beyond. Any such attempt should also include the dimensions of 
environmental pressure and downstream applications.
28 Defined as “authorities who exercise power across borders for the purpose of effecting 
policy” (Avant et al. 2010: 356).
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Global overuse of natural resources, that is, the demand from industrial-4. 
ized countries and the growing number of middle class consumers world-
wide, remains entirely beyond the scope of this discussion. Along with the 
principles above, the patterns and distribution of consumption ought to be 
addressed as well.
Such hybrid forms of governance become more powerful if they leverage market 
access in the United States and the EU. The Kimberley process has been relatively 
successful with regard to markets for rough diamonds.29 Regarding domestic 
attempts by the EU, the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and Restriction 
of Chemicals (REACh) Directive for the chemical industry; the proliferation of 
standards through, for example, the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED); the 
Ecodesign Directive; the Waste of Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) 
Directive; as well as the certification schemes for biofuels and other renew-
able energies could have an impact on global producers if such market leverage 
becomes legally binding for relevant consumer markets and if the global industry 
considers this market leverage as a driver for global markets (Schreurs et al. 2009; 
Jänicke and Rennings 2011). It is thus an interesting perspective to develop 
resource politics that have a regional focus in resource-rich developing countries 
and manufacturing outside the EU and align it with market access in the EU. 
From a governance perspective, this also underlines the need to complement 
a focus on actors and capacities with institutional reforms that, by necessity, 
address governments and legal frameworks as well.
Pioneering action for leveraging market access in Germany, in the EU, and in 
OECD countries will also serve self-interests along important agendas:
  Green industries and consumers that seek to establish sustainable supply 
chains will encounter an uphill battle against information deficits, illicit 
trade, and conflicts around mining operations as long as weak links in global 
management efforts exist.
  Aims to increase resource efficiency and lower greenhouse gas emissions – as 
pursued in the EU’s 2020 strategy – are undermined by system failures of (a) 
providing materials at a price that does not reflect the full social costs, and 
(b) gaps in downstream recycling and disposal activities internationally. A 
rebound effect – more demand for natural resources – and problem-shifting 
are likely side effects as long as international cooperation remains underde-
veloped.
29 Note that Global Witness seems to have announced its definite disengagement from the 
Kimberley Process on December 5, 2011, stating that the certificate is losing its meaning.
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table 2: deficits in resource markets, theoretical explanations, and potential solutions 
deficits theoretical explanation risks and threats Possible solutions
e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l d
ef
ic
it
s
Environ-
mental 
degradation
Negative externalities International and 
global overuse 
of ecosystems; 
deprivation and 
hunger; riots; 
migration
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
on
fl
ic
ts
Internationalization of 
external effects, e.g., 
standards for mining 
and economic incentives; 
incentives to reduce 
“ecological rucksacks”; 
capacity-building
Depletion Unclear property rights, 
legitimate claims of 
future generations
Interruption of 
supply chains; drag 
on green industries 
and high-tech 
industries; windfall 
profits for a few; 
arms races
Property rights including 
long-term responsibility; 
incentives for anti-cyclical 
investments; sustainable 
resource management 
plans; consideration 
of future generations; 
economic incentives; 
capacity-building
Suboptimal 
input; 
inadequate 
recycling
Incomplete information; 
knowledge gaps; 
dissociated markets
Overuse of 
resources; health 
and ecosystems 
endangered 
(if hazardous 
substances are 
used)
Improved monitoring, 
international metal-
covenant; organization of 
recycling and material-flow 
management in developing 
countries; capacity-building
so
ci
o-
ec
on
om
ic
 d
ef
ic
it
s
Price 
hikes and 
volatility
Incomplete information; 
speculation
Food and water for 
the poor become 
prohibitive; riots; 
business at risk
Better information about 
projected market demand; 
reduce incentives for 
speculation, e.g., taxation 
of speculative profit
Illegal 
trade
Unclear property rights; 
lack of transparency
Organized crime; 
corruption; piracy; 
reputational risks 
for companies
Market transparency; 
certification; 
transformation of the OECD 
Due Diligence principles in 
WTO and internationally 
(EITI, Dodd-Frank Act)
“Resource-
curse”
Imperfect competition; 
macroeconomic 
instability; policy failures
Lack of revenues; 
corruption; 
countries stuck at 
the bottom; civil 
wars extended
Resource taxation; 
decoupling of investment 
activities from short-term 
profits; macroeconomic 
and political institutions 
(Natural Resource Charter, 
MMDA); capacity-building
Violation 
of Human 
Rights 
Market and policy failure Resettlements; 
conflicts and civil 
wars; migration 
Strengthen human rights 
(UN Framework on 
Business and Human 
Rights)
Source: Own compilation, see also Bretschger et al. (2010)
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To sum up, today’s global governance of natural resources is highly fragmented 
and spots a few areas in resource-rich developing countries. 
In line with the visions and principles outlined above, a responsibility-driven, 
comprehensive approach that brings together international stakeholder initia-
tives and politics in the EU and other OECD countries will trigger new types of 
system innovation. These stronger governance tools will have to be introduced 
with an international perspective and in cooperation with resource-exporting 
countries. Policy efforts should focus in first instance on the environmental and 
human rights effects of mass metals and phosphorus, while emphasis on critical 
metals should gradually expand.
At least in the long run, it is therefore necessary to develop an international 
resource politics that captures the required holistic perspective. As regards 
resource scarcity, primarily a real decrease in the total quantity of all resources 
used (ultimately on a global scale) and at the same time much more enhanced 
resource-recycling can actually achieve the necessary resource conservation, 
while at the same time alleviating ecological and social impacts.30
Key message: A number of promising initiatives have emerged that seek 
to better govern extractive industries and international resource markets. 
Their strength is a tight focus on a narrow issue that has demanded action. 
However, the challenges will require stronger governance mechanisms to 
address global overuse of resources as well as opportunities and responsi-
bilities in industrialized countries.
Open issues and diverging views: Many actors support current initiatives, 
while some experts remain skeptical about their prospects. Since the future 
of foreign policy in both the United States and Europe is rather uncertain, 
and since the UN may continue to suffer from chronic weakness, civil actors 
may have to find entirely new coalitions and governance mechanisms. The 
role of states and the EU is probably more important for the years ahead 
compared to global governance and multilateral agreements. However, the 
aggregated impacts of all these local impacts will require global solutions in 
the long run.
30 Central to this thinking is the realization that creating regulations solely focusing on 
efficient resource input will not be sufficient. For instance, any reduced resource input 
“per plant” in the current food crop system represents prima facie a gain. However, if at 
the same time the area of currently unused land is increasingly used for, for example, feed 
crop cultivation (triggered by globally rising meat consumption) or for bioenergy plants, 
the required absolute reduction in phosphorus use cannot be met. Global quantity regula-
tion could work by means of public charges or cap-and-trade systems – or by global bans 
(without exceptions) for certain undesirable behavioral patterns, for example, in resource 
exploitation. Alternatively, a solely European strategy would be possible, maybe combined 
with a system of border adjustments to avoid international relocating effects and to push 
more and more states to participate in a global resource governance approach.
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6 new approaches to kick-start 
international resource politics
Incorporating environmental challenges and human rights in approaches to 
international resource markets is not an easy task. Doing this and making best 
use of critical materials according to the principles outlined above calls for an 
international resource politics. The relentless efforts of many people involved 
in ongoing initiatives – NGOs, academics, politicians, business, and numerous 
citizens throughout the world – should be seen as an encouraging sign of 
support. However, it is questionable whether the current system of international 
environmental governance – with its maze of interlocking multilateral agree-
ments – offers a suitable platform for such an endeavor. Resources have many 
characteristics that call for a coordinated bottom-up approach, a polycentric 
type of politics with a high level of participation and transparency. Essential 
pillars of such international resource politics may also be developed in coordina-
tion with business, rather than fighting against them: Consumers and investors 
are increasingly concerned about environmental and social performance, and 
the need for a level playing field is widely acknowledged.
Germany and the EU have good reasons to accept their responsibility in that 
regard. The EU is the largest commodity importer of the world (not China or the 
United States), and Germany is the major manufacturing hub within the EU, 
meaning that its industries and its agriculture are both importers and exporters 
of resources. Moreover and against all current odds, the EU is the largest internal 
consumer market of the world – with numerous leverage capacities for market 
access. Leadership indeed will need to be demonstrated at home: Future 
commitments of the EU and its member states toward resource savings, that is, 
an absolute decoupling of resource use (measured in total material requirements 
or any similar comprehensive indicator) from GDP should be central in any such 
strategy; similar commitments by major corporations (against sales rather than 
unit-based) should be encouraged. Putting one’s own house in order is a key 
ingredient for credibility and preparing market actors for long-term changes.
However, strong international outreach is deemed necessary, firstly, because 
a domestic strategy of using fewer resources is not conceivable, given the inter-
nationally exposed position of Germany, the EU, and most other developed 
societies. Otherwise, it would merely be window dressing and aggravate ongoing 
problem-shifting to developing countries. Secondly, better international coopera-
tion offers manifold benefits, and in particular the opportunity of turning natural 
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endowments of poor countries into prosperity for its people. Formulating such 
international resource politics will require a creative junction of international 
law and private law, as well as interdisciplinary knowledge on governance and 
regulatory issues in a number of regions worldwide. There are a few precedents, 
as many common pool resources are predominantly regionally managed. As of 
today, a strategic interest in an improved sustainable resource management on 
a global scale has been expressed by the EU, Japan, some processing companies, 
and some producing countries. Their thoughts, however, are vague and have not 
yet resulted in a consistent picture. In that regard, the following strategy may 
encourage the formation of an international resource politics.
6.1 From knowledge to action
Generating knowledge for the actors on the ground means the provision of infor-
mation plus the encouragement of learning processes to make use of it. Again, 
the key is to incorporate the dimensions of environmental change and human 
rights into a lifecycle perspective of extraction, production, and use of resources. 
The following proposed steps shall provide better information and generate 
knowledge across a large number of stakeholders (see also earlier recommenda-
tions made by IIED 2002c: 389ff).
6.1.1 An international data hub on sustainable resource management
There is a need to provide the following: harmonized, open-access geological 
data; geo-spatial data; data on critical materials and the resource nexus on the 
use of resources in economies and across industries; basic socio-economic data; 
environmental impacts of key materials and agricultural goods; as well as key 
data for scenario analysis about future use. This should be done in coopera-
tion with existing mechanisms and agencies such as the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), geological 
surveys, as well as with the UNEP International Resource Panel and research 
organizations. 
6.1.2 An International Resource Management Agency
Furthermore, there should be an international agency to improve dissemination 
and learning through coordinated programs of awareness-raising and training 
courses, including broader policy dissemination. It could also host the proposed 
data hub and serve as a secretariat to the proposed multistakeholder forum (see 
below). Regional offices are probably good candidates for accomplishing these 
tasks.
These two initiatives have been suggested in earlier publications (Bleischwitz 
et al. 2009, 284ff; Giljum et al. 2009).
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6.1.3 A Multistakeholder forum for sustainable resource management 
Such a forum does not exist yet.31 It should comprise high-level policy repre-
sentatives of the G20 plus at least 10 main resource-rich developing countries as 
well as industry and civil society. It should use all conceivable means to be open, 
transparent, and participatory. Main tasks should be as follows:
  Discuss and critically review initiatives on transparency and certification, such 
as the OECD due diligence guidelines, EITI, as well as related policies such as 
the Dodd-Frank Act and the proposed EU policy on mining, recycling, and 
waste policies; it should also have a mandate to compare and review invest-
ment agreements, bilateral raw material partnerships, and other relevant 
policies. More comprehensive transparency is to be achieved regarding the 
supply relationships within mining industries, authorities, and financial insti-
tutions as well as the supply chains and the downstream processing industry. 
In the end, major parts of the contracts should be publicly accessible. The 
existing transparency initiatives should also be accompanied by certification 
efforts in the form of product labeling and/or along mineral supply chains.
  Align these activities with available knowledge on sustainable resource 
management as provided by, for example, The Natural Resource Charter, the 
MMDA, the UNEP International Resource Panel (IRP), the World Resources 
Forum, etc.
  Specify the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights for the extractive 
industries. A first step might be to appoint a special rapporteur of the UN 
Human Rights Council on that issue, with a mandate to assess and develop 
recommendations.
  Invite policymakers and corporations to disseminate best practices and to 
develop international policies in a high-level forum, similar to the interna-
tional energy forum.
  Invite civil society to share concerns, point to problematic practices, and 
introduce innovative solutions. 
  Prepare for and accompany an international data hub for observation, 
monitoring, extraction and entire lifecycle use of materials, including data on 
indicators, prices, and indirect resource use (such as ecological rucksacks). 
  Discuss and develop a conflict-risk radar for both regional and international 
security issues, in relation to a system of articulating emerging resource-
related conflicts. 
  Establish international working groups to develop scenarios on future 
resource use, as well as targeted scenarios for certain commodities, product 
groups, and sustainability.
31 Note that a similar initiative had been proposed by the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable 
Development Project (IIED 2002c).
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Assuming that current trends remain stable over the next years, these tasks do 
not seem to be overly ambitious. However, it will be wise to strive for organiza-
tional support or affiliation with an international organization. UNEP certainly 
has many merits, but still lacks expertise and a mandate on human rights and 
conflicts, whereas other organizations have less expertise and no mandate on 
environmental issues. Thus, an affiliation might have to have two or more ties. 
Four arguments in favor of legally binding mechanisms
These three institutional mechanisms, however, will not be enough. The analysis 
in the previous chapters has revealed at least four arguments in favor of legally 
binding mechanisms in international resource politics:
Critical minerals, as highlighted in Chapter 2, are poorly governed and almost 1. 
entirely unregulated. As of today, this favors selected targeted approaches 
(such as the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States and a potentially similar 
regulation on the EU level). However, more comprehensive approaches that 
address the environmental dimension and incentives for managing them 
toward the principles outlined above should also be discussed.
Sustainable mining – however challenging this may be – has limitations when 2. 
entire lifecycle management of resources and, in particular, the demand for 
resources ought to be governed. Making the mining industry a partner for 
sustainable resource management requires approaches that address the 
whole lifecycle of using resources.
The divergence and heterogeneity of actors as well as possible tradeoffs 3. 
between competing aims call for better coordination and mechanisms to 
enhance consistency and strategic orientation. In particular, a global mecha-
nism that moves toward using fewer resources, preserves the commons, and 
allocates essential services for the poor is desperately lacking.
On top of this, there is no strategy to deal with structural deficits such as 4. 
negative externalities, abuse of human rights, huge volatilities, illicit trade, 
etc.
Any gains achieved by material-efficiency increasesa. 32 are counteracted 
by a destructive exploitation of resources, and the developing countries 
are further endangered by environmental dumping and “sleazy waste 
disposal.”
As for future risks, the environmental pressures and the potential for b. 
resource-related conflicts are seriously growing and are a threat to human 
rights and international security (HIICR 2011; Bleischwitz et al. 2009; 
Transatlantic Academy 2012).
32 See, for example, the results of the EU Eco-Innovation Observatory (http://www.eco-inno-
vation.eu); (EIO 2011), Oakdene Hollins (2011), or Bleischwitz, Welfens, and Zhang (2010, 
2011).
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The following section will very briefly introduce new and innovative pillars. Since 
this is seen as the beginning of a debate on international resource politics, any 
comments and follow-ups will be appreciated.
6.2 a take on key areas of concern
In line with our analysis above, internationally coordinated action on critical 
materials should start now; this seems to meet a high demand from a number of 
stakeholders and policymakers. 
6.2.1 A European and international phosphorus policy
First, it has to be noted that issues surrounding phosphorus – a limited and 
non-substitutable material for the food supply with very weak governance struc-
tures – still play a minor role in policy and public awareness.33 Awareness-raising 
should be given a high priority. Second, policy has disaggregated the individual 
phenomena of phosphorus use and flow in various tasks – there is neither a 
holistic approach to the problem nor coordination among the actors involved. A 
legal basis for regulating phosphorus from agricultural sources does not exist, but 
there are different soft regulations that address phosphorus flows, for example 
within the context of detergents, wastewater, and sewage sludge. Here, perverse 
incentives act as barriers to changing the technical structures of recycling plants 
for phosphorus recovery and closed loops (Werland et al. 2010).
A holistic approach should address the international and worldwide dimen-
sions of a sustainable phosphorus management. Due to close interactions and 
inter-linkages to other biotic and abiotic resources as well as core challenges 
such as climate change, agriculture, and nutrition, the initiative should be 
designed as part of an internationally aligned resource policy. An integrated 
phosphorus management should start with the monitoring of phosphate flows in 
Germany (similar to the Swiss activities in this realm) (Binder et al. 2009). In the 
medium term, the approach should be extended to the European scale. Interna-
tional scenarios have to project future demand and applications and the poten-
tial recovery of phosphate (Cordell 2010). It should be especially fruitful with 
regard to emerging and developing countries as well as for business (WBCSD 
2009). Indeed, awareness is key, and NGOs can play an indispensable role in that 
regard.
The high recovery rate of phosphorus from sewage sludge (up to a 90% 
recovery rate from sewage sludge by means of mono-incineration) is techni-
cally feasible, but it is a downstream and costly approach. Hence, sustain-
33 However, the Nutrient Platform established in January 2011 and the Global Phosphorus 
Network are certainly promising steps; see, for example, the recent brief of the EU Eco-In-
novation Observatory at http://www.eco-innovation.eu. The Dutch Steering Committee 
for Technology Assessment calls for the development of an EU policy for phosphates (de 
Haes et al. 2009).
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able phosphorus management has to consider quantity regulation in order to 
achieve a reduction in primary phosphorus input and close loops for secondary 
phosphorus at the same time (Ekardt 2011), as well as to provide incentives for 
investments. Inter alia, it would be necessary:
  To address all actors – importers, producers, user (agriculture), research, 
etc.;
  To achieve a site-specific optimized fertilization that seeks harmonization 
with the healthy feeding of the world population, i.e. questioning the current 
livestock-intensive agriculture and diet;
  To generate economic incentives by introducing a pollutant charge or a 
phosphorus tax on the production of fertilizers; 
  To legally bind recovery as a central approach, supported by appropriate 
incentives (such as a mixture quota for p-containing fertilizers, prohibition 
of subsurface filling and land-filling of p-containing waste, co-incineration 
ban of sewage sludge, development of long-time deposits of sewage sludge, 
recovery of anthropogenic urine);
  To implement a market introduction program for mono incineration plants 
and adequate phosphorus recovery.
6.2.2 An international metal covenant 
Given the high losses (see Chapter 2) of materials through the export of used 
goods from developed countries, which often ends in low-quality recycling and 
improper disposal, legally binding mechanisms such as an international metal 
covenant would be a conceivable option. This could be achieved in a contract 
(covenant) between key manufacturers and suppliers, the recycling industry, 
and the relevant public authorities in major export and destination countries. 
The covenant should establish long-term goals for increasing resource efficiency 
through a high-quality recycling market. The covenant defines the responsibili-
ties of the different actors, the policy tools, implementation, and evaluation. The 
parties, industrial enterprises, or their associations would commit themselves to 
resource protection goals, and the states would ensure a stable and supportive 
environment for the agreed term. In contrast to non-binding commitments, 
the covenant should principally be enforceable in court. At the same time, the 
contract should provide for effective dispute resolution and sanctions (Wilts et 
al. 2011). 
Such a covenant has the potential to establish a framework toward closing 
material cycles for consumer goods more effectively at an international level and 
shows a number of benefits, such as the reduction of transaction costs in new 
partnerships between industry sectors and public bodies, the increase of states’ 
regulatory capacities, and industry’s acceptance. It prevents the undermining of 
the extended producer’s responsibility for exports – material stewardship – and 
gives incentives for recycling design (Wilts and Bleischwitz 2011).
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6.2.3 Transform bilateral agreements toward sustainable resource management 
Bilateral trade and investment policies offer ample leeway for leadership from the 
EU and Germany. Any such agreement should refer to common principles such 
as those provided by the Natural Resource Charter, the Mining Model Agreement, 
and others. In line with due diligence supply chain efforts, this could be accom-
panied by sectoral investment agreements in areas relating to smelters and refin-
eries, metal and recycling industries. The collaboration in the field of environ-
mental technologies should be aligned to encourage large-scale investments into 
renewable energies and a green infrastructure while minimizing environmental 
and social risks.
The existing bilateral raw material partnerships (e.g., Germany with Mongolia, 
Kazakhstan) should also adhere to such principles and fulfill basic conditions 
of transparency, accountability, and sustainability. The EU could openly discuss 
market leverage into the EU as well as standards for human rights and sustainable 
resource management, as outlined above in this process – possibly in coordina-
tion with other OECD countries. In addition, the EU and Germany should offer 
support for technology transfer and capacity-building. The latter is important 
for measures in these countries such as national plans for sustainable resource 
management, extraction taxation schemes, and raw material funds; they will 
also help to promote constitutional legality, good governance, and the develop-
ment of macroeconomic institutions in the resource-rich countries (Collier and 
Venables 2011; Bleischwitz 2011). 
Indeed, all documents should become publicly available. The institutional 
implementation should be done in alignment with the international multistake-
holder forum to encourage other countries to follow and disseminate experi-
ence. 
6.3 toward a sustainable world economy 
The normative principles outlined above are well in line with an understanding 
of markets as being guided by rules and serving purposes of higher ends. The 
knowledge generated through the activities proposed above will lead to a better 
basic understanding of how resources, nature, and development processes 
interact. This will support the resilience of societies with a number of transi-
tion processes moving in new directions. However, the implication is not that all 
processes of nature or within societies are proposed to become part of the global 
market or any scrutinized financialization of services. To stimulate debates on 
how the world economy ought to be transformed, our outline of an international 
resource politics suggests a few directions. A more detailed discussion is certainly 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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6.3.1 Cutting subsidies and introducing resources taxes
The EU shall go ahead and reduce environmentally harmful subsidies on fossil 
fuels, mining, agriculture, and land use in its member states and at lower levels of 
policymaking (Usubiaga et al. 2011); it should eliminate all export subsidies and 
refrain from using food aid to promote exports. Furthermore, it should promote 
this objective in bilateral and plurilateral agreements and support a Global Subsi-
dies Initiative toward these aims.
To get the prices right and to counteract the rebound effect, the tax base should 
be broadened toward natural resources. Given that construction minerals account 
for the biggest share resources and are less sensitive to international competi-
tiveness than most commodities, the EU should introduce a tax on construction 
minerals (Bahn-Walkowiak et al. forthcoming). It should also consider taxing 
water and land use. Such taxes can be seen as a precursor toward a more inclusive 
taxation of resources in general. Practical experiences with the taxes on aggre-
gates have been gained in some EU member states (in particular in the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, and the Czech Republic), which all levy taxes or charges 
for sand, gravel, and crushed rock (EEA 2008; Bahn-Walkowiak et al. 2010). 
Developing countries will have to consider their respective needs and the 
mixed experiences with taxing minerals extraction (ICMM 2009; Otto et al. 2006; 
WTO 2010, 12). However, carbon taxation is planned on being introduced in 
China, and more economic incentives will be a pillar of international resource 
politics. Taxing resources in developing countries, however, can be done in a 
sustainable manner and offers incentives for savings along the whole interna-
tional value chains. On an international scale, coordinated domestic measures, 
such as an agreement to increase taxes uniformly beyond a nationally defined 
level, could be an option to avoid international distortions.
6.3.2 Leveraging finance for sustainable resource management
Leveraging finance for sustainable development is a task that clearly goes beyond 
politics and addresses the private sector (IIED 2011). The question of sources 
of finance is high on the political agenda in all fora that deal with international 
sustainability and development issues such as the UNFCCC and other conven-
tions, Rio+20, and the G20. The public sector has a key role to play and serious 
regulations will be needed to increase state income, reduce tax evasion practices, 
and improve intranational equity. But the current financial and economic 
crisis makes it all the more important to think about more structural ways to 
redirect investment away from the old brown economy to a green, sustainable, 
and equitable economy. Pressing problems of food and water scarcity in many 
regions of the world, the infrastructure needed for better energy services for all, 
and the research that is still needed to use critical minerals in the most sustain-
able manner all require new and additional finances. It will simply not be enough 
to create incentives for greener products. Much caution and thought should be 
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given to the right design of new mechanisms to leverage additional private capital 
through scarce public resources. Here, some important lessons can be learned 
from existing practices in development finance. The current trend of financializa-
tion in the form of commodification of natural resources (or even “development 
benefits”) that are then turned into tradable financial market products in that 
context can even contribute to a distraction from the real problem. The devel-
opment and ecological impacts of such measures are often highly questionable. 
Some current proposals on mobilizing innovative sources of finance include:
  The Global Subsidies Initiative launched by the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD) aims at cutting environmentally perverse 
subsidies (Runnals 2011). Many developing countries spend billions of dollars 
on such subsidies (e.g., India spends $15 million on fuel subsidies annually). 
McKinsey (2011) estimates the global amount of subsidies spent annually on 
resources in the order of $1.1 trillion. Reporting on such subsidies is a first 
step that should be followed by coordinated efforts to reduce them. Indeed, 
this needs to include all unsustainable subsidies (e.g., on agriculture); it does 
not exclude targeted subsidies for environmental goods, for example, and it 
should go along with social programs and reforms.
  A levy on international aviation and shipping (eventually: taxing volatility of 
commodities).
  A transaction fee on international emissions trading (including auctioning) 
and a Financial Transaction Tax.
6.3.3 Rethinking international trade 
In addition to the proposals made above – and since all attempts to govern 
commodities will have to take the world trade law into account – a rethinking of 
international trade policy is at stake. This clearly goes beyond the recent decision by 
the United States, the EU, and Japan to file a formal complaint against China with 
the WTO on the question of rare earths. In general, social or environmental resource 
regulations are usually seen as a restriction to free global trade by the WTO jurisdic-
tion (see, also on the following, Ekardt 2011, § 7 C; Ekardt et al. 2009; Ekardt and 
Schmeichel 2009). Although the WTO rules allow for exceptions (such as Article XI: 
2 GATT on critical shortages; Article XX GATT on the protection of human, animal 
or plant life or health; or Article IX: 3 on a possible waiver) more should be done 
to formally align good governance practices in countries with international trade 
(Meléndez-Ortiz and Biswas 2011). This effort will have to go against sweeping 
resource nationalism and trends favoring bilateral or plurilateral agreements – and 
it should exactly counteract these trends and stress the necessity of global rules for a 
fair trade. The proposals made above point in this direction; especially an initiative 
to eliminate subsidies for exports could re-open the doors in the ongoing negotia-
tions. Using this to level the playing field for trading environmental technologies 
could contribute to their deployment internationally. Internalizing the externalities 
of international shipping and aviation should also become a priority. All this may 
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be seen as tinkering with the current system, however, it may not only buy time but 
also come closer to shifting patterns of production and consumption. Such shifts, 
in addition to the principles mentioned above, should trigger fresh thinking about 
balancing local livelihoods, resilience, and international trade.
6.3.4 New legal mechanisms at the international level
In the short run, new legal mechanisms at the national level will trigger sustainable 
resource management. In the long run, new legal mechanisms such as an interna-
tional convention for sustainable resource management will deem it necessary to 
constitute fundamental legal principles for sustainable resource management.
Such a convention, however, will probably be established in a stepwise 
manner via mechanisms such as the multistakeholder forum proposed above 
and, in particular, toward developing incentives for resource conservation and 
the legally new area of material stewardship in cooperation with industry. Thus, 
it is imaginable that initially mainly information exchange and certification will 
be undertaken (Bleischwitz et al. 2009). A main task will be to align such a legal 
mechanism with national and international climate politics. Areas of overlap are, 
for example, certification of biofuels, sectoral agreements, and product-specific 
regulations. Having expressed this, one should keep in mind that key actors such 
as business, developing countries, and emerging economies have expressed their 
interest to become engaged in better governance of resources, which should help 
to facilitate synergies.
Key message: An international resource politics is at stake. It could be 
launched with a strengthening of existing initiatives and move from knowl-
edge to action via an international data hub, an international resource 
management agency, and a multistakeholder forum. Leadership of the EU 
and Germany will be essential and is supported through their dependence 
on imports. Further activities should include policies on phosphorus, an 
international recovery of metals, and transformation of bilateral agreements 
toward sustainable resource management. The long-term perspective is a 
transition toward a sustainable world economy. 
Open issues and diverging views: There is a lot of strife regarding the trans-
parency and certification agenda. Their limitations and inherent compat-
ibilities are less rigorously discussed. The resource-efficiency agenda has 
not yet been transformed into a viable international strategy. International 
resource politics is probably closer to bottom-up and polycentric forms of 
governance, whereas the scope of multilateral approaches still needs to be 
discussed. On top of this, the relationship between our thoughts on an inter-
national resource politics and ongoing discussions about a green economy 
and green growth are worth exploring.
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7 conclusions on international 
resource politics
International resource politics is on the verge of becoming established from 
two different angles: Firstly, efforts on the certification of mineral supply chains 
addressing so-called conflict minerals and corruption in developing countries, 
and secondly, efforts to lower the material purchasing bills through resource 
efficiency. However, the complete picture embraces many more features, 
including the grief of the poor and greed of those who make profits. International 
resource politics thus potentially offers a rich field to address key dimensions of 
sustainable development on the ground. While millions of people are driven into 
poverty by rising food prices and competition over access to scarce resources, 
the escalating impact on international relations and the need for comprehen-
sive approaches is obvious. Individual attempts to let equitable eco-innova-
tions flourish are just not enough: It is a governance challenge that calls for new 
alliances across actors and sectors as well as for new models of prosperity that 
make using fewer resources attractive for all citizens. Given the vested inter-
ests in favor of extracting and producing more, however, it is also an agenda for 
balancing power to govern the globe via ambitious and binding mechanisms. 
More importantly, with the chance of managing resources more sustainably for 
the people and the planet, it is worth becoming engaged in such a mission. Our 
paper has started to develop proposals along that road and we look forward to a 
lively discussion on those topics.
table 3: approaches for international resource policies 
Initiatives short description actors
International 
data hub on 
sustainable resource 
management
Open-access geological and geo-spatial data on 
critical resources and the resource nexus, socio-
economic data, environmental impacts, etc.
EIA, FAO, geological 
surveys, UNEP 
IRP, research 
organizations
International 
Resource 
Management Agency
Improve dissemination and learning through 
coordinated programs of awareness-raising and 
training courses; host of the data hub; secretariat of 
multistakeholder forum; regional offices
Could be initiated 
by Germany and the 
EU; should receive 
support from UN 
and international 
organizations 
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Initiatives short description actors
Multistakeholder 
forum for a 
sustainable resource 
management
Discuss and critical review: EITI, Dodd-Frank-Act, 
EU policy, investment agreements, bilateral raw 
material agreements, etc.; align activities with NRC, 
MMDA, UNEP IRP, WRF; specify UN Framework on 
Business and Human Rights for extractive industries; 
dissemination of best practices; developing conflict-
risk radar
High-level 
representatives 
of G20, at least 
10 resource-rich 
developing countries, 
industry, NGOs
European and 
international 
phosphorus policy
Site-specific optimized fertilization that provides 
for healthy feeding of world population; economic 
incentives (pollutant charges or phosphorus 
tax); legally binding of recovery (quota); market 
introduction program for phosphorus recovery plants
EU policymakers, 
producers, importers, 
users (agriculture), 
research
International metal 
covenant
Closing of industrial material loops; export of 
recycling technologies; establishment of recycling 
infrastructure; recovery of important resources, e.g., 
copper, PGMs, etc.
Key manufacturers 
and suppliers, 
recycling industry 
and relevant public 
authorities in 
major export and 
destination countries 
(including the EU)
Transformation 
of bilateral 
agreements toward 
sustainable resource 
management
Referring to common principles such as NRC, MMDA, 
OECD due diligence; sectoral investment agreements; 
collaboration for environmental technologies; 
international dialogs; capacity-building
Germany and 
other raw material 
importing countries 
and EU, exporting 
countries, UNDP, 
UNEP
Cutting subsidies / 
introducing resource 
taxes
Reducing environmentally harmful subsidies on fossil 
fuels, mining, agriculture, land use in EU member 
states; eliminate export subsidies; support Global 
Subsidies Initiative; broaden tax base toward natural 
resources (e.g., construction minerals, land use, 
water)
EU, national 
governments
Leveraging finance 
for sustainable 
resource 
management
Abolish unsustainable subsidies; levy on international 
aviation and shipping; transaction fee on international 
emissions trading
Global reporting 
initiatives (on 
subsidies), private 
sector, green 
investment banks
Rethinking 
international trade
Investment treaties on basis of IISD model contract; 
reformulation of trade policies relying on GATT/GATS
WTO members 
New legal 
mechanisms at 
international level
International convention for sustainable resource 
management; align with national and international 
climate politics
International 
policymakers, 
business, developing 
countries, emerging 
economies 
Source: Own compilation.
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Facts about critical minerals for a green economy
table 4: Facts about critical minerals for green technologies
minerals relevance for green technologies environmental dimension economic dimension socio-political dimension
green
applications
estimated 
demand
Impacts recycling substitution concentration of 
production in 2010
est. concentration 
of reserves in 2010
Import- 
 dependence
Human aspects
Phosphorus 90% of global output 
for fertilizers
increase by 
50-100% by 
2050
global peak expected in 2030; 
resource depletion expected in 
80-120 years; extraordinary 
dissipative usage; frequently 
combined with heavy metals; 
impacts on biodiversity; over-
fertilization
historically: by 
application of animal 
manure and human 
excreta 
today: recapturing 
from sewage sludge in 
experimental phase 
technology lock-in 
in current industrial 
agriculture
China (37%), US (15%), 
Morocco (15%)
Morocco and 
Western Sahara 
(77%)
100% import-
dependence
food security; unfair 
allocation of access to 
fertilizers and prices 
for the mineral
coltan/
tantalum
micro capacitors, 
turbines in power 
generation, and 
aircraft construction
factor 1 (of 
tantalum)
artisanal and small-scale 
production causing erosion and 
water pollution; dissipative and 
dispersed usage; threat to gorilla 
population
limited due to 
dispersed usage, est. 
at 20-25% (US), 
20% worldwide
partly but difficult 
(with loss of 
efficiency) using 
niobite, aluminum, 
ceramics, glass, 
platinum, titanium, 
zirconium 
according to official data, 
strong in Australia (48%), 
Brazil (16%), DRC (9%) 
(data for 2009); assumed 
strong illicit trade in DRC 
and Rwanda
Top 3 producers: 63%
Brazil (62%), 
Australia (38%); 
Central Africa 
usually not included 
in data
100% import-
dependence
conflict mineral, Dodd 
Frank Act, strongly 
inhuman mining 
conditions, ASM
rare earth 
elements 
(ree)
automotive catalysts, 
fluorescent lamps, 
permanent magnets 
for hybrid cars and 
wind turbines 
factor of 2.5 
by 2020
wastewater, radioactive substances no data depending on element China (97%), India (2%)
extremely high (>75% in one 
country)
Top 3 producers: 99%
China (48%), CIS 
(17%)
very large reserves 
and range (more 
than 200 years)
no production 
in EU; 100% 
import-
dependence
mining conditions 
widely unknown
Platinum group 
metals (Pgm)
car and industrial 
catalysts, fuel cells
factor of 1.5 
by 2030
large amounts of mining waste; 
very energy- and water-intensive; 
sulfur dioxide at smelting
industry and glass 
industry works with 
almost closed loops 
(secondary input), est. 
45% in D
very difficult South Africa (75%), Russia 
(13% of platinum production)
Top 3 producers: almost 90%
South Africa (95%) 
extremely high 
concentration but 
very large reserves 
(more than 200 
years)
100% import-
dependence
working conditions; 
use-conflicts (large 
parts for jewelry)
gallium LEDs, diodes, solar 
cells, thin film PVs
factor of 
2.6 by 2020 
(1973: 16t; 
2007: 103t)
byproduct of aluminum, dissipative 
usage; at processing acids and 
complexing agents, air pollution, 
arsenic dust
high capacities in e.g. 
Germany, USA, UK, 
Japan
organic-based 
LEDs; for about 
40% of applications 
substitution is 
impossible
low no data no data no data
copper electric and electronic 
future technologies; 
e.g., ICT, wind energy 
plants, geothermal 
energy, fuel cells, 
solar thermal systems
factor of 2.6 
by 2030
declining ore grades => growing 
volumes of excavation material
100% recyclable; 
15% worldwide, 55% 
in D
partly by aluminum 
and glass fiber
Chile (34%), Peru (8%), US 
(7%)
very large production 
quantities
(> 1,000,000 tons/year)
Top 3 producers: 28%
Chile (24%), Peru 
(14%), Australia 
(13%)
low – due to 
very large 
reserves 
working conditions, 
use-conflicts due to 
large groundwater 
input needed for 
mining
Source: Compilation on basis of Angerer et al. (2009); Bäuerle et al. (2011); Jaakkola et al. (2011); Lutz (2010); Mildner et al. (2011b); USGS (2011); Wäger et al. (2010)
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minerals relevance for green technologies environmental dimension economic dimension socio-political dimension
green
applications
estimated 
demand
Impacts recycling substitution concentration of 
production in 2010
est. concentration 
of reserves in 2010
Import- 
 dependence
Human aspects
Phosphorus 90% of global output 
for fertilizers
increase by 
50-100% by 
2050
global peak expected in 2030; 
resource depletion expected in 
80-120 years; extraordinary 
dissipative usage; frequently 
combined with heavy metals; 
impacts on biodiversity; over-
fertilization
historically: by 
application of animal 
manure and human 
excreta 
today: recapturing 
from sewage sludge in 
experimental phase 
technology lock-in 
in current industrial 
agriculture
China (37%), US (15%), 
Morocco (15%)
Morocco and 
Western Sahara 
(77%)
100% import-
dependence
food security; unfair 
allocation of access to 
fertilizers and prices 
for the mineral
coltan/
tantalum
micro capacitors, 
turbines in power 
generation, and 
aircraft construction
factor 1 (of 
tantalum)
artisanal and small-scale 
production causing erosion and 
water pollution; dissipative and 
dispersed usage; threat to gorilla 
population
limited due to 
dispersed usage, est. 
at 20-25% (US), 
20% worldwide
partly but difficult 
(with loss of 
efficiency) using 
niobite, aluminum, 
ceramics, glass, 
platinum, titanium, 
zirconium 
according to official data, 
strong in Australia (48%), 
Brazil (16%), DRC (9%) 
(data for 2009); assumed 
strong illicit trade in DRC 
and Rwanda
Top 3 producers: 63%
Brazil (62%), 
Australia (38%); 
Central Africa 
usually not included 
in data
100% import-
dependence
conflict mineral, Dodd 
Frank Act, strongly 
inhuman mining 
conditions, ASM
rare earth 
elements 
(ree)
automotive catalysts, 
fluorescent lamps, 
permanent magnets 
for hybrid cars and 
wind turbines 
factor of 2.5 
by 2020
wastewater, radioactive substances no data depending on element China (97%), India (2%)
extremely high (>75% in one 
country)
Top 3 producers: 99%
China (48%), CIS 
(17%)
very large reserves 
and range (more 
than 200 years)
no production 
in EU; 100% 
import-
dependence
mining conditions 
widely unknown
Platinum group 
metals (Pgm)
car and industrial 
catalysts, fuel cells
factor of 1.5 
by 2030
large amounts of mining waste; 
very energy- and water-intensive; 
sulfur dioxide at smelting
industry and glass 
industry works with 
almost closed loops 
(secondary input), est. 
45% in D
very difficult South Africa (75%), Russia 
(13% of platinum production)
Top 3 producers: almost 90%
South Africa (95%) 
extremely high 
concentration but 
very large reserves 
(more than 200 
years)
100% import-
dependence
working conditions; 
use-conflicts (large 
parts for jewelry)
gallium LEDs, diodes, solar 
cells, thin film PVs
factor of 
2.6 by 2020 
(1973: 16t; 
2007: 103t)
byproduct of aluminum, dissipative 
usage; at processing acids and 
complexing agents, air pollution, 
arsenic dust
high capacities in e.g. 
Germany, USA, UK, 
Japan
organic-based 
LEDs; for about 
40% of applications 
substitution is 
impossible
low no data no data no data
copper electric and electronic 
future technologies; 
e.g., ICT, wind energy 
plants, geothermal 
energy, fuel cells, 
solar thermal systems
factor of 2.6 
by 2030
declining ore grades => growing 
volumes of excavation material
100% recyclable; 
15% worldwide, 55% 
in D
partly by aluminum 
and glass fiber
Chile (34%), Peru (8%), US 
(7%)
very large production 
quantities
(> 1,000,000 tons/year)
Top 3 producers: 28%
Chile (24%), Peru 
(14%), Australia 
(13%)
low – due to 
very large 
reserves 
working conditions, 
use-conflicts due to 
large groundwater 
input needed for 
mining
Source: Compilation on basis of Angerer et al. (2009); Bäuerle et al. (2011); Jaakkola et al. (2011); Lutz (2010); Mildner et al. (2011b); USGS (2011); Wäger et al. (2010)
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table 5: selected relevant governance approaches
Initiative description actors involved Part of supply chain strengths Weaknesses
Analytical Fingerprint 
(AFP)
Certified Trading 
Chains (CTC)
voluntary system of self-commitment by partners in the 
trading chain, verification of origin and trade volume 
analysis, independent audits, on-the-ground assessments of 
mining conditions
BGR (German 
Bundesanstalt für 
Geowissenschaften) / 
GIZ and the local mining 
authorities (DRC, Rwanda)
mining and trade 
(focus on companies’ 
concessions)
synergies with other capacities building programs
fingerprinting process
complex and costly implementation
capacity-building needed
multiple stakeholders involved can 
hamper the process
Dodd-Frank Act legal obligation for US companies reporting to SEC to declare 
use of “conflict minerals” (tin, gold, tungsten, tantalum)
SEC (Security and 
Exchange Commission), 
SEC reporting companies
SEC reporting 
companies
link to due diligence guidelines and iTSCi
impact in the US and its listed companies
increases knowledge of supply chains
military groups run out of money
standard will spread worldwide
compliance issues
questionable impact on Congolese 
people
international repercussions yet 
unknown
excludes artisanal mining from 
supply chain
EITI (Extractive 
Industries Transparency 
Initiative)
Further initiatives:
Publish What you Pay
Revenue Watch 
Institute
set of principles and procedures aimed at strengthening 
accountable and transparent governance in resource-rich 
countries through the verification and full publication of 
company payments and government revenues from oil, gas, 
and mining
governments, companies, 
civil society, industry 
associations, institutional 
investors, countries; World 
Bank
11 compliant countries 
(incl. Norway)
22 candidate countries 
(incl. Congo)
17 supporting countries 
(incl. Germany)
governments, 
investors, mining 
industry, local 
companies/trading 
agents, processing 
companies
monitors cash flows
principles for compliance
establishes dialogs with actors
synergies with capacity-building programs
supports transparency in the value chain (certification)
platform for mining industries
puts transparency on international agenda
standard for investors’ decisions
complementary to Frank-Dodd Act
compliance relatively weak
no BRIC countries involved yet 
(enforcement rather unlikely)
“speed of the slowest”
aggregated figures allowed
Global e-Sustainability 
Initiative / Electronic 
Industry Citizenship 
Coalition (GeSI / EICC) 
(2005)
initiative of electronics industry electronics industry smelters proactive approach - possible interaction with 
capacity-building programs and other initiatives
mining operations yet unaddressed; 
complexity of ITC supply chain 
makes real progress difficult; 
probably no enforcement
Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI)
network-based organization that produces a comprehensive 
sustainability reporting framework and performance 
indicators
Supply Chain Disclosure Revision Workstream
mining and metals sector supplement
stakeholders, corporate 
organizations
minerals industry increases transparency, develops guidelines for 
monitoring and disclosure
voluntary
International Council 
on Mining and Metals 
(ICMM)
Work program on 
material stewardship
industry association to address the core sustainable 
development challenges faced by the mining metals industry
“ICMM Principles,” widely regarded as a consensus statement 
of expectations for the social, economic, and environmental 
performance of mining companies
“ICMM Toolkits,” widely recognized as best practice guidance
21 leading mining and 
metal companies, 31 
national and regional 
mining associations 
and global commodity 
associations
mining, extraction, 
smelters
all company members have committed to 
implementing the ICMM Sustainable Development 
Framework and a number of supporting position 
statements
limited number of members; 
certainly no regulatory 
competencies; risk of weak symbolic 
actions
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Initiative description actors involved Part of supply chain strengths Weaknesses
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unknown
excludes artisanal mining from 
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Industries Transparency 
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countries through the verification and full publication of 
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governments, companies, 
civil society, industry 
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investors, countries; World 
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22 candidate countries 
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17 supporting countries 
(incl. Germany)
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industry, local 
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agents, processing 
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monitors cash flows
principles for compliance
establishes dialogs with actors
synergies with capacity-building programs
supports transparency in the value chain (certification)
platform for mining industries
puts transparency on international agenda
standard for investors’ decisions
complementary to Frank-Dodd Act
compliance relatively weak
no BRIC countries involved yet 
(enforcement rather unlikely)
“speed of the slowest”
aggregated figures allowed
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mining operations yet unaddressed; 
complexity of ITC supply chain 
makes real progress difficult; 
probably no enforcement
Global Reporting 
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network-based organization that produces a comprehensive 
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mining and metals sector supplement
stakeholders, corporate 
organizations
minerals industry increases transparency, develops guidelines for 
monitoring and disclosure
voluntary
International Council 
on Mining and Metals 
(ICMM)
Work program on 
material stewardship
industry association to address the core sustainable 
development challenges faced by the mining metals industry
“ICMM Principles,” widely regarded as a consensus statement 
of expectations for the social, economic, and environmental 
performance of mining companies
“ICMM Toolkits,” widely recognized as best practice guidance
21 leading mining and 
metal companies, 31 
national and regional 
mining associations 
and global commodity 
associations
mining, extraction, 
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all company members have committed to 
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Framework and a number of supporting position 
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Initiative description actors involved Part of supply chain strengths Weaknesses
IFC – Performance 
Standards on 
Environmental and 
Social Sustainability
Equator-Principles
eight performance standards establish standards that the 
client is to meet throughout the life of an investment of IFC
projects supported by IFC 
and MIGA, arms of the 
World Bank Group;
75 adopting financial 
institutions
business activities 
with environmental 
and/or social risks 
and/or other impacts
iTSCi membership Initiative of the tin smelting industry smelting industry; DRC, 
Rwanda
suppliers and 
exporters of minerals 
(in particular ASM)
proactive approach - possible interaction with 
capacity-building programs and other initiatives
mining operations yet unaddressed; 
commercial visibility may bias real 
results; need to publish data for 
awareness-raising; probably no 
enforcement
Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme
joint governments, industry, and civil society initiative on 
diamonds; certification scheme
governments, industry, 
civil society, regional 
economic integration 
organizations
49 members representing 
75 countries (incl. EU and 
BRIC)
suppliers and 
exporters of diamonds
establishes a well-acknowledged certification scheme 
for diamonds (49 countries accounting for approx. 
99.8% of trade with rough diamonds)
voluntary
insufficient control mechanisms – no 
third-party monitoring
no standards of production, only 
proof of origin
further areas of application difficult 
because diamonds have unique 
features
consensus bind decision-making
Model Mine 
Development 
Agreements (MMDA)
model clause for mining agreements mining companies, mining 
investors, countries, 
civil society, national 
governments
mining flexible does not cover exploration
does not cover local level 
agreements
OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance for 
Responsible Supply 
Chains of Minerals 
from Conflict-Affected 
and High-Risk Areas
model supply chain policy for a responsible global supply chain 
management of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk 
areas
companies, non-
governmental 
organizations, processing 
facilities, regional 
governments
82 companies take part 
in the pilot (Great Lakes 
region Africa for tin, gold, 
tungsten, tantalum)
up / down-stream 
operators
gives guidelines for companies and OECD member 
states
voluntary
practical consequences yet unknown
burdensome requirements might 
push companies from OECD 
countries out of the sector
application outside the OECD not 
in scope
OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational 
Enterprises
recommendations addressed by governments to multinational 
enterprises operating in or from adhering countries
updated in 2011 to incorporate human rights into corporate 
duties consistent to UN Framework (see below)
OECD, governments, 
multinational enterprises
42 OECD and non-OECD 
countries
up / down-stream 
operators
multilaterally agreed
supported by implementation mechanism of National 
Contact Points (NCPs)
no enforcement mechanism, 
voluntary
UN Framework on 
Business and Human 
Rights (Ruggie 
Process and follow-up 
mechanisms)
“Business and Human Rights,” six-year process came to its 
conclusion at the June 2011 UN Human Rights Council
UN, NGOs, UN council 
working group
guiding principles
annual forum on business and human rights
no strong implementation power
UN-EU Partnership 
on Natural Resources 
and Conflict 
Prevention
aims at ensuring inclusion of conflict prevention and sensitivity 
in Natural Resource Management programs; framework of 
technical assistance useful to EU and UN agencies to plan and 
design intervention strategies where extractive industries are 
driving factors of conflicts
EU and UN governments, 
extractive industries
impact still pending contribution of other key parties 
is needed in order to achieve a 
peaceful outcome in a coordinated 
and constructive manner
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IFC – Performance 
Standards on 
Environmental and 
Social Sustainability
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model clause for mining agreements mining companies, mining 
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mining flexible does not cover exploration
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model supply chain policy for a responsible global supply chain 
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companies, non-
governmental 
organizations, processing 
facilities, regional 
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82 companies take part 
in the pilot (Great Lakes 
region Africa for tin, gold, 
tungsten, tantalum)
up / down-stream 
operators
gives guidelines for companies and OECD member 
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voluntary
practical consequences yet unknown
burdensome requirements might 
push companies from OECD 
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application outside the OECD not 
in scope
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recommendations addressed by governments to multinational 
enterprises operating in or from adhering countries
updated in 2011 to incorporate human rights into corporate 
duties consistent to UN Framework (see below)
OECD, governments, 
multinational enterprises
42 OECD and non-OECD 
countries
up / down-stream 
operators
multilaterally agreed
supported by implementation mechanism of National 
Contact Points (NCPs)
no enforcement mechanism, 
voluntary
UN Framework on 
Business and Human 
Rights (Ruggie 
Process and follow-up 
mechanisms)
“Business and Human Rights,” six-year process came to its 
conclusion at the June 2011 UN Human Rights Council
UN, NGOs, UN council 
working group
guiding principles
annual forum on business and human rights
no strong implementation power
UN-EU Partnership 
on Natural Resources 
and Conflict 
Prevention
aims at ensuring inclusion of conflict prevention and sensitivity 
in Natural Resource Management programs; framework of 
technical assistance useful to EU and UN agencies to plan and 
design intervention strategies where extractive industries are 
driving factors of conflicts
EU and UN governments, 
extractive industries
impact still pending contribution of other key parties 
is needed in order to achieve a 
peaceful outcome in a coordinated 
and constructive manner
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Voluntary Principles 
for Security and 
Human Rights
framework to help provide security to the facilities while 
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms; unveiled 
in 2000 by the US State Department and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom
four participating 
and three engaged 
governments, 17 
corporations, eight 
non-governmental 
organizations, three 
observers
governments, 
companies in the 
extractive and 
energy sector, 
non-governmental 
organizations
guidance to companies operating in zones of conflict 
or fragile states
voluntary
Washington 
Convention (CITES); 
Convention on 
International Trade in 
Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and 
Flora
voluntary agreement of states regulating trade with some 
natural resources (e.g., ivory)
governments, 175 parties exporting / importing 
countries
may entail interesting legal mechanism for 
commodities (conflict minerals)
enforcement weak, gives 
incentives for illicit trade
Source: Own compilation 
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Dr. Raimund Bleischwitz is Co-director of the Research Group on Material Flows 
and Resource Management at the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment 
and Energy. He was the Transatlantic Academy Fellow in Washington DC from 
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and is currently a visiting professor at the College of Europe, Bruges. His activi-
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